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Debate on Social Media Liability
Patrick Zurth*
What can be done against discrimination, bullying, insults,
and the spread of dangerous fake news on social media platforms?
While platforms in the United States enjoy broad discretion on
how to approach that issue, there are both legal and political debates regarding social media regulation. Germany, by contrast, advances the opposite approach: requiring social media providers to
block or remove illegal content. The Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz
(“NetzDG,” “Network Enforcement Act,” the “Act”) of 2017 outlines a specific procedure for implementing such a claim. The Act is
the first of its kind in the western democratic states. Other countries
have invoked or discussed whether to follow the German example,
which could make NetzDG a pioneer in its strategy of combating
hate speech and fake news. This Article is intended to explain the
background, mode of operation, and reception of the NetzDG.
Furthermore, this Article will attempt to clear up misunderstandings
and discuss current developments around this Act. A main purpose
of this Article is to examine whether the Act is a suitable prototype
for the United States Congress to introduce regarding platform liability and to determine which alternatives are available at hand.
To that end, the Article evaluates the constitutional leeway for a
regulation of social media. The Article concludes that Congress
*
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could establish principles and mechanisms similar to the NetzDG
which, despite its room for improvement, is better than its reputation. Data and recent judgments indicate that the debate surrounding this system, however, was based on exaggerated assumptions
and misunderstandings. Therefore, it is hopeful that the United
States averts the defected discussion surrounding the NetzDG and
draws positive and negative lessons from it.
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INTRODUCTION

When Samantha Jespersen googled her name, the very first result that appeared was a Facebook business page called “Samantha
Rae Anna Jespersen’s Butthole.”1 Even though Jespersen reported
this unfortunate page several times, the forum remained on Facebook until January 2020 when the social media platform finally took
it down.2 The Facebook page was created in 2012 when Jespersen
was fifteen years old; however, she did not discover it until 2015.3
The page said, “This unofficial Page was created because people
on Facebook have shown interest in this place or business. It’s not
affiliated with or endorsed by anyone associated with Samantha Rae

1
See Katie Notopolous, Facebook Won’t Remove This Woman’s Butthole as a Business
Page, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
katienotopoulos/facebook-butthole-business [https://perma.cc/PTW2-9959].
2
Id.
3
Id.
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Anna Jespersen’s Butthole.”4 A pin on the map indicated the correct
location of her former home.5 Everyone interested in her, whether
for personal or business reasons, would see this as the first Google
Search result.6 It is troubling that it took Facebook eight years to
take action.
Cases like Samantha Jespersen’s seem to call for strict regulation of social media. The fact that platforms introduced self-imposed
guidelines about impermissible content on their sites and perform
content moderation (i.e., monitoring posts and comments for compliance with their rules) does not solve the problem in cases where
they simply do not act. For these cases, German law provides for a
special complaint procedure. Social networks had until January 1,
2018 to implement all required procedures.7 The novel NetzDG imposes further obligations on large social media platforms, such as
requiring publication of user complaint transparency reports.8
This regulatory approach has attracted attention in many other
countries, including the United States.9 After the first experiences
4

Id.
Id.
6
Id.
7
According to Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act],
July 12, 2017, Art. 3, the Act came into force on Oct. 1, 2017. According to Art. 1, § 6,
para. 2, the procedures pursuant to section 3 had to be introduced within three months after
that. In this Article, quotations of NetzDG are taken from the English translation, available
at https://perma.cc/UE9G-E9VB. However, it is neither an official nor an optimal
translation. It omits, for example, STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 201a in the
list of provisions in NETZDG § 1, para. 3.
8
See Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], July 12,
2017, §§ 2, 3 [hereinafter “NetzDG”], available at https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/
Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
[https://perma.cc/56SV-UY46].
9
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2012–
13, 2016, 2018, 2030 (2018); Imara McMillan, Enforcement Through the Network: The
Network Enforcement Act and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
20 CHI. J. INT’L L. 252 (2019); Laura E. Moon, Note, A New Role for Social Network
Providers: NetzDG and the Communications Decency Act, 28 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 623 (2019); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1519, 1521–22, 1533–38 (2019); Mark Scott & Janosch Delcker, Free Speech vs.
Censorship in Germany, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/germanyhate-speech-netzdg-facebook-youtube-google-twitter-free-speech/
[https://perma.cc/D2VF-LWLF]; Rebecca Zipursky, Note, Nuts About Netz: The Network
Enforcement Act and Freedom of Expression, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1325 (2019).
5
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with NetzDG and demands from a member of parliament, the United
Kingdom debated copying the German act.10 On May 13, 2020, the
French lower house parliament11 partially followed the German example and passed a law obliging social media platforms to render
content inaccessible that manifestly infringes specified provisions
within twenty-four hours of notification.12 The EU intends to harmonize the duty of platforms to take down content with its proposed
Digital Services Act.13 This draft regulation proposed on December
15, 2020 is intended to compel online intermediaries, including social networks, to remove illegal content and provide, among many
other things, not only a notice and action mechanism but also an
internal complaint handling system.14 Less like the NetzDG, however, is the EU Commission’s proposal for a regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online by allowing governments to order the removal of such content.15 On January 1, 2021,
the Kommunikationsplattformen-Gesetz (“KoPl-G”, “Communication Platform Act”) came into force in Austria, obliging
social media providers to remove illegal content, as well as to

10

See Laurence Dodds, British MPs Call for German-Style Law to Block Hate Speech
on Social Media, TELEGRAPH (July 28, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
2018/07/28/british-mps-call-german-style-law-block-hate-speech-social-media/
[https://perma.cc/9DJB-BLS6].
11
Assemblée nationale (National Assembly).
12
See Marc Schuler and Benjamin Znaty, New Law to Fight Online Hate Speech to
Reshape Notice, Take Down and Liability Rules in France, TAYLORWESSING (May 21,
2020), https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2020/05/new-lawto-fight-online-hate-speech-in-france [https://perma.cc/UB74-FMGZ]. Various language
versions of the initial draft from July 9, 2019 are available at
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/tris/en/index.cfm/search/?trisaction=search.de
tail&year=2019&num=412&mLang=EN [https://perma.cc/DYG6-5W2P].
13
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a
Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive
2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
14
Id.
15
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, COM (2018) 640 final (Sept.
12, 2018). On December 10, 2020 the European Parliament and the Council (the body
representing the 27 Member States) agreed on that proposal. European Commission Press
Release IP/20/2372, Security Union: Commission Welcomes Political Agreement on
Removing Terrorist Content Online (Dec. 10, 2020), available at https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2372
[https://perma.cc/VE74-LG8T].
The regulation must now be formally adopted by those two legislative bodies. Id.
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supply reporting and verification procedures resembling those of
NetzDG.16
As was to be expected, the NetzDG triggered a major debate in
Germany and other countries. Sharp criticism included referring to
Germany’s overall agenda on dealing with propaganda on the Internet as a “cautionary tale.”17 Unfortunately, some criticism was
partly based on misconceptions. The misleading summary of the
Act, issued by UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye on the promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
cautioned that the NetzDG “would impose fines up to 50 million
EUR on social media companies that fail to remove undesirable content from their platforms.”18 By the same token, referring to the
NetzDG as “drastic legislation requiring social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to remove false news, defamatory hate speech,
and other unlawful content within twenty-four hours of receiving
notice of the same, upon pain of multi-million-euro fines”19 is fallacious for several reasons, as this Article will explain.
The purpose of this Article is to prevent misunderstandings in
the debate on a change of law in the United States and draw conclusions from Germany’s experiences. Currently, in the United States,
Internet platforms are protected against any liability for user posts.
According to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act

16

See
KOMMUNIKATIONSPLATTFORMEN-GESETZ
[KOPL-G]
[COMMUNICATION
PLATFORMS ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 151/2020 (Austria), available at
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnum
mer=20011415 [https://perma.cc/AQ3W-83BM]. On the law in general and its similarities
with NetzDG, see Gregor Fischer et al., Così fan tutte: Some Comments on Austria’s Draft
Communications Platforms Act (Graz Law, Working Paper No 05-2020, 2020).
17
See Lisa-Maria N. Neudert, Germany: A Cautionary Tale, in COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA: POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICIANS, AND POLITICAL MANIPULATION ON SOCIAL
MEDIA 153, 179 (Samuel C. Woolley & Philip N. Howard eds., 2018) (“Germany has
emerged as a cautionary authority on concerns over computational propaganda.”).
18
See David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression),
Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Reference OL DEU 1/2017, at 1 (June 1, 2018),
available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-DEU-12017.pdf [https://perma.cc/JGE2-2HNY].
19
Nunziato, supra note 9, at 1521–22; accord Balkin, supra note 9, at 2013 (“It requires
social media companies to take down many different kinds of speech, including hate
speech, within twenty-four hours of a complaint.”).
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(“CDA”),20 these platforms have broad discretion on how to engage
in content moderation. Both legal scholars and policymakers from
both sides of the aisle, for different reasons, are attacking the CDA’s
approach. Recent events fueled the debate on this provision.
After large social networks were criticized for being too lenient
on former President Donald Trump,21 a debate among those providers arose about how to deal with the President’s posts.22 On May 26,
2020, Twitter, for the first time, took action by flagging a post for
fact-checking when the President made unsubstantiated claims
about mail-in voting.23 The President’s fury about commenting on
his post resulted in an executive order, targeting social media’s blanket immunity from liability for its users’ posts and causing a political debate about CDA section.24 The order, issued on May 28, 2020,
mandates a proposal for legislation and aims to fight “online censorship” by restricting leeway under CDA section.25 As a result, on
September 23, 2020, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sent draft
legislation to Congress to reform CDA Section 230 so platforms
could not be shielded from promoting, soliciting, and facilitating

20

47 U.S.C. § 230 [hereinafter CDA Section 230].
E.g., Facebook apparently privileged then-presidential candidate Donald Trump
during his 2016 campaign by leaving posts untouched that actually had violated the
platform’s standards; Facebook was severely criticized for being too lenient with him. See
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1655 (2018).
22
See Quint Forgey, Zuckerberg, Dorsey Spar Over Twitter’s Flagging of Trump’s
Tweets, POLITICO (May 28, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/28/
zuckerberg-dorsey-spar-over-twitters-flagging-of-trumps-tweets-286881 [https://perma.
cc/L8AS-67SL]; Dylan Byers & Jason Abbruzzese, Facebook Employees Go Public with
Disagreement over Zuckerberg’s Handling of Trump, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-employees-go-public-disagreementover-zuckerberg-s-handling-trump-n1220961 [https://perma.cc/7EG4-WRDZ].
23
See Jason Silverstein, Twitter Flags Trump Tweet with Fact-Checking Label for First
Time, CBS NEWS (May 27, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/twitter-adds-factcheck-warning-trump-tweets/ [https://perma.cc/6RKH-ZU3J].
24
See Brian Fung et al., Trump Signs Executive Order Targeting Social Media
Companies, CNN (May 28, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/politics/trumptwitter-social-media-executive-order/index.html [https://perma.cc/P9LM-FC2U].
25
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
21
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harmful criminal activity and have limited leeway in removing content.26 Interactive computer service providers would now even be
required “to offer easily accessible and apparent mechanisms for users to notify providers of unlawful content.”27
Since the draft legislation, Congress has not debated on abolishing or amending CDA Section 230. Congress even overruled President Trump’s veto against the National Defense Authorization Act
(“NDAA”), an annual defense funding bill, which was intended to
wring abolition of CDA Section 230, without taking any legislative
action on that provision.28 Given that several congressional lawmakers already made proposals to amend CDA Section 230,29 and President Biden criticized and advocated revoking it,30 further legislative
action can be expected in the upcoming term. Regardless, the political debate was recently fueled by Twitter and Facebook’s permanent suspension of President Trump’s accounts in response to his
numerous claims of election fraud and his role in the storming of the

26

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S REVIEW OF SECTION 230 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996 (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/ag/department-justice-s-review-section-230-communications-decency-act-1996
[https://perma.cc/J265-H8CM]. The DOJ also provided a document detailing its edits
section by section. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SECTION BY SECTION (Sept. 23, 2020), available
at
https://www.justice.gov/file/1319326/download
[https://perma.cc/2X7S-SEJ3]
[hereinafter SECTION BY SECTION].
27
See SECTION BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 2.
28
See Grace Segers, Senate Overrides Trump’s Veto of Defense Bill, CBS NEWS (Jan.
2, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/senate-overrides-trump-veto-defense-bill/
[https://perma.cc/XQ2U-F7ET]. On January 1, 2021, the Senate voted 81 to 13, with a twothirds vote required to overturn the veto. On December 28, 2020, the House had already
voted to overturn the veto with a majority of 322 to 87.
29
See infra Section I.B.
30
See Interview by N.Y. Times Editorial Board with President Joe Biden (Jan. 17,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/01/17/opinion/joe-biden-nytimesinterview.html [https://perma.cc/TKQ4-ARP5] (“The idea that it’s a tech company is that
Section 230 should be revoked, immediately should be revoked, number one. For
Zuckerberg and other platforms.”).
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Capitol on January 6, 2021.31 Those decisions, once again, ignited a
dispute on social media’s power and free speech.32
Thus, after twenty-five years of total immunity for Internet platforms,33 the United States vigorously debates social media’s legal
and social responsibility in a modern Internet. This Article contributes to that debate by discussing the German approach as a potential
role model for a new US federal law. To that end, the Article addresses two different ways to regulate networks: (1) imposing rules
externally, as the NetzDG does, and (2) promoting internal regulation by means of provider-imposed standards. Both shape the legal
status quo in Germany.
Part I expounds upon the contemporary broad immunity accorded to social media providers in the United States. Next, Part II
and III frame Germany’s approach with the NetzDG. Subsequently,
Part IV addresses platforms’ self-imposed standards and explains
how German law deals with them. Part V goes on to discuss the different policy issues on the regulation of social media. Finally, Part
VI describes the constitutional framework for a potential reform in
the United States and makes proposals drawn from the NetzDG.
I.

“GOOD” SAMARITANS UNDER CDA § 230

This Article will first outline how differently the United States
currently regulates social network liability and what discussions are
taking place before examining how the NetzDG may affect this debate. Under current US law, Internet platforms are not exposed to
any obligations. First, the statute negates a platform’s duty to take

31

See Twitter Inc., Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8,
2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html [https://per
ma.cc/DCT7-WM8L]; Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 7, 2021, 7:47 AM),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10112681480907401
[https://perma.cc/TW56MYS7].
32
See Lauren Aratani, Trump Twitter: Republicans and Democrats Split Over Freedom
of Speech, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2021/jan/09/trump-twitter-republicans-democrats [https://perma.cc/X6E4-B4ZS].
33
CDA Section 230 was enacted in 1996. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. On
its broad protection, see supra Section I.A.
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down illegitimate content. It reads, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service34 shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”35
Second, social networks cannot be held accountable for taking
down content they do not want to post, irrespective of the providers’
intentions or reasons—so users do not have any remedies at their
disposal if an Internet platform, acting in good faith, bans content:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.36
Thus, CDA Section 230’s protection is twofold: (1) it grants
“immunity both for the content they moderate” and (2) “the content
they miss.”37 The statute provides for blanket immunity against civil
claims in various fields38 only excluding criminal law, intellectual

34
An interactive computer service is defined as “any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.” CDA § 230(f)(2).
35
CDA § 230(c)(1). An “information content provider” is one who creates or develops
content. See id. § 230(f)(3) (whereas an “interactive computer service” then provides or
enables access).
36
Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
37
See James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 103
(2015).
38
See id.; Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid SocialOrdering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2009 (2019).
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property law, electronic surveillance law, and sex trafficking law.39
Thus, the provision is all-encompassing.40
Congress took a different approach to determining what Internet
content violates copyright law. According to Section 512(c)(1) of
the Copyright Act, a service provider’s41 immunity necessitates that
it “does not have actual knowledge” of the infringement, “is not
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent,” and upon notification of an infringement “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material” and does not,
despite control over the activity, “receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity.”42 Hence, the infringed party
can notify the Internet platform which de facto leads to the provider’s obligation to take down illegal content—a notice-andtakedown system.43 On the contrary, under the CDA, a notice does
not compel any action by the platform.44
A. Internet’s Footing: Trajectory, Purpose, and Scope of the
Blanket Immunity
Many consider CDA Section 230 to be of paramount importance
for the past and future development of the Internet,45 culminating in
39

See CDA §§ 230(e)(1)–(5). The DOJ’s draft in September 2020 proposed to further
exempt antitrust law from CDA Section 230 immunity. See SECTION BY SECTION, supra
note 26, at 2.
40
See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to exclude violations of the Fair Housing Act from
the immunity’s scope).
41
A service provider is “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator
of facilities therefor.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
42
Id. § 512(c)(1).
43
The notification must meet several requirements. See id. § 512(c)(3). As to the
proceeding after receiving the notice and removing the content, see id. §§ 512(g)(2)–(3).
44
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331–33 (4th Cir. 1997) (considering a
distributor as a “publisher” under CDA section 230(c)(1)); Felix Wu, Collateral
Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 318
(2011) (“Except for a brief interlude in the California courts, no court has specifically
adopted the view that notice undermines immunity.”).
45
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 427, 436–37 (2009) (“Without something like the Section 230 immunity, it would be
very risky to create social software that allows others to blog or publish, much less create
a social networking site….The Internet’s largely open networks and legal rules, like
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a characterization of the provision’s wording as “The Twenty-Six
Words That Created the Internet.”46 The section’s relevance and
positive effects are so evident that even its critics concede that such
benefits exist.47 The legal situation prior to CDA Section 230’s enactment in 199648 sheds light on the assumption that the statute
played a major role in watering the delicate little plant that was the
early stages of the Internet industry. After the Southern District of
New York initially held that a provider was not liable for defamatory
content because it was a mere distributer with neither knowledge nor
reason to know of the statements since it had not engaged in any
content moderation,49 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co. later made lawmakers sit up and take notice.50 Even though delivered by a lower state court, a major threat was identified in this

Section 230, have helped ensure a remarkably diverse ecology of applications, services,
and content.”); Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L REV. 2027, 2039
(2018); Jeff Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Immunity, 15 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 123, 125 (2010) (“Section 230 has allowed the Internet to flourish as an
open medium in which all consumers-rather than just the websites’ employees-provide
content. If websites were not immune for third-party content, the Internet likely would not
be as open as it is today.”); Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet’s First
Amendment. Now Both Republicans and Democrats Want to Take It Away, REASON (July
29, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-internets-first-amendmentnow-both-republicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/
[https://perma.cc/CRA99JHB] (“The future of free speech—and a lot more—may depend on preserving Section
230.”).
46
See generally JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET
(1st ed. 2019).
47
E.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying
Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404, 412–13 (2017) (“Section
230 immunity has enabled innovation and expression beyond the imagination of the
operators of early bulletin boards and computer service providers the provision was
designed to protect.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries
and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 985, 1009 (2008) (“[A]n important
protection against unanticipated and practically uncontrollable liability for torts committed
by individual users.”).
48
See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003); Klonick, supra
note 21, at 1604–05; Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 404–06; Madeline Byrd &
Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for a Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 407–08
(2019); Wu, supra note 44, at 315–17; Kosseff, supra note 45, at 128–31.
49
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
50
See generally Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
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decision. The New York Supreme Court treated a provider as a publisher because it “exercised editorial control over the content of messages posted on its computer bulletin boards.”51 Because of this
holding, Internet providers faced an intricate dilemma: exercising
absolutely no moderation opened the door to illegal activities on
their platforms, yet any (unsuccessful) attempt to prevent that could
expose them to liability.52 As a result, they were rather discouraged
from conducting content moderation.53
Congress found an unambiguous solution for this predicament.
The enacted provision’s purpose is twofold: (1) to “encourage platforms to be ‘Good Samaritans’ and take an active role in removing
offensive content” and (2) “also to avoid free speech problems.”54
On one hand, the purpose of the provision is to promote content
moderation.55 But on the other hand, statements of opinion must be
protected from arbitrary censorship.56 Regardless, engaging in content moderation remains CDA Section 230’s purpose and is not a
condition for blanket immunity from liability.57 Hence, regarding
take down claims,58 the statute applies to both good and bad Samaritans.59 Having knowledge of illegal activity,60 encouraging the
posting of illegal content,61 or even running a “meretricious business

51

Id. at 2.
Note, supra note 45, at 2028–29.
53
Grimmelmann, supra note 37, at 103 (“Taken together, the decisions created a
perverse disincentive to moderate.”).
54
Klonick, supra note 21, at 1602; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330–31 (4th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407–
08 (6th Cir. 2014); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
55
Klonick, supra note 21, at 1608.
56
Id.
57
The statute does not contain any restrictions in that respect. CDA § 230(c)(2)(A); see
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
58
CDA § 230(c)(1).
59
Wu, supra note 38, at 2009; see also Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 408.
60
See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
61
Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 415–17 (6th Cir. 2014)
(finding no material contribution to infringements through soliciting gossip); see also Byrd
& Strandburg, supra note 48, at 410–11, 435 (“Courts have considered inducement-like
arguments against CDA 230 immunity but mostly have not been persuaded by them. This
is probably the right result under the current statute….”).
52
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model”62 does not suffice to deny immunity under CDA Section
230. Thus, courts tend to apply the provision broadly.63
That being said, CDA Section 230’s shield is not absolute. Most
notably, it only safeguards Internet providers against liability for
foreign content and leaves accountability for people’s own statements untouched—acting as “information content provider” that
creates or develops content.64 A website will be found to participate
in the development of unlawful content and thus be covered by the
CDA Section 230 exception if it “contributes materially” to the unlawful conduct.65 A website can carry both the operator’s own content, for which they are responsible as the information content provider, and third parties’ content to which CDA Section 230’s immunity applies.66 In that regard, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a rental platform was “not entitled to CDA immunity for
the operation of its search system, which filters listings, or of its
email notification system, which directs emails to subscribers according to discriminatory criteria.”67 Yet, this search system was
built on discriminatory parameters.68 It can be inferred that social
media websites qualify for CDA Section 230’s privilege so long
as their content moderation algorithms employ unbiased criteria
and fairly and equally enforce the standards imposed by the network
providers.

62
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016) (protecting a
website, which took an active role and was tailored to make sex trafficking easier, from
liability).
63
Id. at 19 (“There has been near-universal agreement that Section 230 should not be
construed grudgingly.”); Jones, 755 F.3d at 408 (“[C]ourts have construed the immunity
provisions in § 230 broadly.”); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“The majority of federal circuits have interpreted [CDA § 230], to establish
broad ‘federal immunity….’”).
64
See CDA § 230(f)(3); see also Note, supra note 45, at 2029 (noting that the immunity
exemption follows from the term “another” in Section 230(c)(1)).
65
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1168 (9th Cir. 2008). This test has been adopted by other circuits. See Jones, 755 F.3d at
412–17.
66
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1162–63; Jones, 755 F.3d at 408–09.
67
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1167.
68
Id. (“Roommate’s search function is similarly designed to steer users based on
discriminatory criteria.”).
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B. The Inescapable Debate
In sum, CDA Section 230 provides for an utterly broad protection, leaving many dubious Internet platforms unaccountable and
blocking victims’ paths for relief. This raises major questions as to
how to restrict the CDA’s scope. Shielding bad Samaritans, who
deliberately promote illicit actions online while lacking any relation
to free speech, from legal remedies seems questionable when considering the provision’s initial purpose. Nevertheless, numerous
voices still emphasize CDA Section 230’s importance and speak
against any alterations.69
Yet, many things have changed since 1996. Firstly, while many
used to advocate and promote an unrestricted “open speech” Internet, the public is now increasingly focused on a “healthy speech”
approach—thus inching closer to the European approach.70 Some,
however, often invoking the implications to freedom of speech, disapprove of stronger content moderation.
Even though CDA Section 230 seemed untouchable for a long
time, pressure is now coming from both political sides. In 2018,
Democrat Senator Mark Warner from Virginia proposed to “make
platforms liable for state-law torts (defamation, false light, public
disclosure of private facts) for failure to take down deepfake or other
69

E.g., Eric Goldman, Dear President Biden: You Should Save, Not Revoke, Section 230
at 1 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper, Jan. 14, 2021) (“Section 230 has
facilitated the emergence of Web 2.0—a universe of Internet services that help us
communicate and engage with each other in powerful and novel ways. Many of the top
Internet services depend on Section 230, and we rely on Section 230-enabled services
hourly.”); Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. REFLECTIONS 33, 34 (2019) (“[R]educing Section 230’s immunity poses
major risks to online free speech and the associated benefits to society.”); Eric Goldman,
Why the State Attorneys General’s Assault on Internet Immunity Is a Terrible Idea, FORBES
(June 27, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/06/27/why-the-stateattorneys-generals-assault-on-internet-immunity-is-a-terrible-idea/ [https://perma.cc/UU2
J-MZWQ] (“Even a tiny legal change to Section 230 could upset the delicate balance that
facilitated the extraordinary Internet boom over the past 15+ years.”); Brown, supra note
45 (“Eroding the law would seriously jeopardize free speech for everyone, particularly
marginalized groups whose ideas don’t sit easily with the mainstream. It would almost
certainly kill upstarts trying to compete with entrenched tech giants.”); Balkin, supra note
45, at 434; H. Brain Holland, In Defense on Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating
Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 391–04 (2008).
70
Wu, supra note 38, at 2009–10. Twitter is a good example of this shift. See id. at 2012;
Klonick, supra note 21, at 1620–21, 1626–27.
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manipulated audio/video content.”71 Approximately one year later,
Republican Senator Josh Hawley from Missouri criticized CDA
Section 230 as a “sweetheart deal” and introduced the Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act in order to require large providers
to apply to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) for immunity
every two years—their “political neutrality” would be a major consideration.72
Additionally, in 2020, several other proposals followed. In
March, the bipartisan Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of
Interactive Technologies (“EARN IT”) Act suggested creating a
panel consisting of nineteen members, the National Commission On
Online Child Sexual Exploitation Prevention, in order to fight child
exploitation materials.73 The bill passed the Committee on the Judiciary on July 20, 2020.74 In June, several US Republican Senators
proposed a Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act
which would link CDA Section 230’s immunity to a duty of good
faith.75 In the same month, the bipartisan Platform Accountability
and Consumer Transparency (“PACT”) Act aimed to amend the
blanket immunity as well—forcing online platforms to remove
court-determined illegal content within twenty-four hours, requiring
them to provide a complaint system that processes reports within
fourteen days, and allowing users to appeal online platforms’ content.76 Several Republican politicians then attempted to drive the
goal of restricting platforms’ discretion as to content moderation
with the Stop the Censorship Act, introduced by eight Congressmen
on July 29, 202077 and the Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity
Act, introduced by three US Senators on September 8, 2020.78

71

MARK WARNER, POTENTIAL POLICY PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA
8 (2018), available at https://perma.cc/7ATN-X473.
72
S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to
Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies, SENATE.GOV (June 19, 2019),
https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/SR7G-34HN].
73
S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020).
74
Id.
75
S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020).
76
S. 4066, 116th Cong. (2020).
77
H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2020).
78
S. 4534, 116th Cong. (2020).
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After all, “[c]onservatives claim that Section 230 gives tech
companies a license to silence speech based on viewpoint. Liberals
criticize Section 230 for giving platforms the freedom to profit from
harmful speech and conduct.”79 Right-wing political attacks, based
on the questionable assertion that social media would silence conservative voices,80 have peaked at the executive order of President
Trump and the subsequent DOJ’s draft in September 2020.81
However, even before this political debate, there were already
various academic considerations to modernize CDA Section 230.
While the criticism of some scholars is rather reserved,82 others
clearly called for an amendment on a judicial or legislative level.83
The platform’s broad discretion in moderating content is viewed
critically.84 Several scholars, hence, argue in favor of a (modified)
notice-and-takedown procedure.85
79

Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and
Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Speech Reform 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub.
Law Research Paper No. 20-8, 2020); see also Brown, supra note 45 (expounding several
political attacks on CDA Section 230 by both Republican and Democratic politicians);
Goldman, Dear President Biden, supra note 69, at 2 (“In general, the Democrats want
Internet services to remove more content; the Republicans want Internet services to remove
less content.”).
80
Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 15–16.
81
Supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
82
E.g., Klonick, supra note 21, at 1669–70 (“[Social media platforms] are private selfregulating entities that are economically and normatively motivated to reflect the
democratic culture and free speech expectations of their users. But these incentives might
no longer be enough.”).
83
E.g., Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, TECHCRUNCH (Sept.
29, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-this-liability-shield/
[https://perma.cc/UJ2F-XJUK]; Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 404, 413 (advocating a
reform, not abolition); Heather Saint, Note, Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act: The True Culprit of Internet Defamation, 36 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 39, 65–67 (2015).
84
Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1009 (“I am arguing that if we limit intermediary
responsibility…we should also limit intermediary power to control speech. There is no
reason that any speech rights that Internet intermediaries possess should be vested in
intermediaries’ management, rather than attributed to users only when those users
misbehave.”).
85
E.g., id. at 1012; Grimmelmann, supra note 37, at 106–08 (referring to copyright law
and distinguishing between automated and human moderation, proposing to apply blanket
immunity only to the former so that “content-specific human curation could be treated as
distributors (liable after notice)”); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors,
6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 115–18 (2007) (arguing in favor of a
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II. THE PATH TO REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA IN GERMANY: POLITICAL AND
LEGAL BACKGROUND

The appropriate approach in Germany is also being evaluated,
albeit against a different backdrop. This Part will discuss the path
that led to this discussion, illuminating this different background.
A. Political Background: Polarization, Slander, and Solution
Approaches
Parallel to the ever-increasing spread of social networks, the political discourse in Germany also changed. While the two largest
German political parties formed a governing coalition over a long
time during the last two decades, diminishing their traditional rivalry, gaps in the political spectrum were filled by others; polarization is no longer between those two parties, but outside them.86 The
political discourse was shaken by the refugee crisis in 2015, when
many refugees fled to Europe.87 German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to allow about one million refugees to enter Germany
for humanitarian reasons was initially met with much approval, but
then provoked increasing criticism.88 There would be many xenophobic voices89 that expressed offensive criticism not only in the
pub or in their social circles, but also on social networks. These people were hostile to foreigners and German politicians, who, in their
opinion, let too many foreigners enter the country.90 Even though
there has always been hate speech on social networks, this was a
breeding ground for the problem to get out of hand. So far, the court
standardization following the model of trademark law, namely section 32(2) of the Lanham
Act); Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: Does The Internet Still Need Section
230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597, 620–22 (2019) (advocating for a provision
similar to copyright law).
86
See Sara Miller Llana, Grand Coalition? Why Some in Germany Prefer Polarization
to a Mushy Middle, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Europe/2018/0226/Grand-coalition-Why-some-in-Germany-prefer-polarization-to
-a-mushy-middle [https://perma.cc/G6BU-P7J8].
87
Neudert, supra note 17, at 155.
88
See Manuela Bojadžijev, Migration as Social Seismograph: An Analysis of
Germany’s ‘Refugee Crisis’ Controversy, 31 INT’L J. POL., CULTURE, & SOC’Y 335, 339–
41 (2018).
89
Neudert, supra note 17, at 155.
90
See DAVID KAYE, Wir schaffen das!, in SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO
GOVERN THE INTERNET (Columbia Global Reports, 2019).
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decisions handed down on the deletion of posts on social networks
are also characterized by xenophobia.91 According to German police
surveys, xenophobic, racist, and anti-Semitic crimes still accounted
for most hate crimes in 2018 and 2019.92
Already facing that issue in September 2015, the Federal Ministry of Justice93 set up a committee of Internet service providers, civil
society organizations, and media control institutions to solve the
problem on a voluntary basis.94 But, in the opinion of the government, this approach did not provide for the necessary relief.95 The
NetzDG’s draft was largely based on the fact that hate crime and
other punishable content poses a major threat to the peaceful coexistence of a free, open, and democratic society when it cannot be
effectively fought and prosecuted.96 The referendum in the UK on
remaining in or leaving the EU in June 2016 and the US presidential
election in November 2016 highlighted the problem of spreading
false news on the Internet.97
A study commissioned by the government, based on research
carried out in January and February 2017, found that there was insufficient removal of reported posts on social networks.98 It concluded that, “compared to the last test, YouTube greatly improved
the deletion rate for reported criminal content (from 10% to 90%),

91

See infra Section I.A.
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 19, http://dip21.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/19/177/1917741.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2VQ-PBBC] (Ger.).
93
The full name of the agency is the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer
Protection, or Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz [BMJV].
94
Federal Ministry of Justice, Gemeinsam gegen Hassbotschaften [Together Against
Messages of Hate], Dec. 15, 2015, https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/
News/Artikel/12152015_TaskForceErgebnispapier.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
[https://perma.cc/FR8B-SHPR].
95
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 1, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/18/123/1812356.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J86-Q3YX].
96
Id.
97
See id.
98
See id at 1–2.
92
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Facebook deleted less (from 46% to 39%), and Twitter continued to
react poorly to user messages (only 1%).”99
B. Legislative Procedure and Political Debate
The Federal Ministry of Justice reacted to the 2017 study with a
draft law in the same year.100 After the federal government101 passed
this draft, it went through the usual legislative procedure. The Bundesrat102 essentially welcomed the proposal, but had numerous proposed amendments, which are not particularly relevant for this Article.103 At the subsequent hearing before the responsible committee
in the Bundestag, the German federal parliament, considerable
doubts were raised by some experts.104 Among other aspects, the
risk of over-blocking and the possible violation of fundamental
99

Löschung rechtswidriger Hassbeiträg bei Facebook, YouTube und Twitter:
Ergebenisse des Monitorings von Beschwerdemechanismen jugendaffiner Dienste
[Deletion of Illegal Hate Posts on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter: Results of the
Monitoring of Complaint Mechanisms in Youth-Related Services], JUGENDSCHUTZ.NET,
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/News/Artikel/03142017_Monitoring_j
ugendschutz.net.pdf;jsessionid=134D5AA175B6063A13AD05F7AC6C2713.2_cid297?_
_blob=publicationFile&v=3 [https://perma.cc/WTX2-XTVF].
100
For the first version of the draft, see Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung Entwurf
eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken
(Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz NetzDG) [Bill of the Federal Government Draft Law to
Improve Law Enforcement in Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act—NetzDG)],
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/RegE_NetzDG.p
df;jsessionid=1FF6F8ED7EBB23C10839EC738041EAC5.2_cid289?__blob=publication
File&v=2 [https://perma.cc/7EZV-6HGK].
101
Bundesregierung. The federal government is at the head of the executive branch but
plays an important role in the legislative process, with most laws being drafted in the
ministries due to their greater competence and staffing.
102
The Bundesrat (Federal Council) is, besides the Bundestag (Federal Parliament), the
second legislative body. It represents the sixteen states of Germany (Länder) at the federal
level and is––with varying degrees of power––involved in the enactment of all federal
laws.
103
The Bundesrat was successful, for example, in including STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB]
[PENAL CODE], § 201a in the catalogue of NETZDG § 1, para. 3 and enshrining responses
to complaints in NETZDG § 3, para. 2 no. 3a. See Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft],
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12727, 19–20, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/18/127/1812727.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2XM-NEDA].
104
For a summary of most experts’ opinions, see Geplante Änderung des
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzes in der Kritik [Planned Change of the Network
Enforcement Law in the Criticism], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, https://www.bunde
stag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2020/kw25-pa-recht-netzwerkdurchsetzung-699188
[https://perma.cc/7NPU-B6LJ].
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rights were stressed.105 Subsequently, the bill was amended in the
parliament,106 but in essence left untouched.
The proposed law triggered a major debate. One newspaper, for
instance, claimed that the Belarusian autocrat Lukashenko was invoking the German law for his oppressive measures.107 Moreover, it
is assumed that “countries with less noble goals [than Germany]
have taken inspiration from NetzDG.”108 In the early days of
NetzDG, Twitter temporarily mistakenly suspended, based on its
own standards, the account of a German satirical magazine for
mocking a far-right politician’s post on Muslims.109 It was grist for
the NetzDG critics’ mill, as it did seem to prove that platforms may
misjudge even obviously legal posts.110 Yet, the act does not provide
the sanction of account suspension. It is, therefore, doubtful whether
there is a reasonable connection to the NetzDG.111
105
E.g., Reporter Ohn Grenzen Für Informationsfreiheit [Reporters Without Borders for
Freedom of Information], Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verbesserung
der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken der Fraktionen von CDU/CSU und SPD
(BT DS 18/12356) [Opinion on Draft Law on Enhance Law Enforcement in Social
Networks of the CDU/CSU and SPD Parliamentary Groups (BT DS 18/12356)],
https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/510780/aee6b7be1689e54c1740d78210db5d44/
mihr_rog-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR4E-8XN8]. This Article addresses over-blocking
infra Section V.C. and fundamental rights infra Section II.C.2.
106
See Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of
the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 5–13,
https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/130/1813013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G2TBHU5U].
107
Martin Ferber, Facebook-Gesetz: Schießt Maas übers Ziel hinaus?, AUSBURGER
ALLGEMEINE (June 20, 2017), https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/FacebookGesetz-Schiesst-Maas-uebers-Ziel-hinaus-id41792751.html
[https://perma.cc/ZM3K9ZRF].
108
Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1361 (“Russia, Singapore, and the Philippines have all cited
NetzDG in pending legislation that will limit speech online….NetzDG has become the
impetus not only for troubling censorship in Germany itself, but also for global censorship
around the world.”).
109
David Martin, German Satire Magazine Titanic Back on Twitter Following ‘Hate
Speech’ Ban, DUEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/german-satiremagazine-titanic-back-on-twitter-following-hate-speech-ban/a-42046485
[https://perma.cc/QZ24-ZZLQ].
110
See id.; Andrea Diener, Storch-Satire ist nicht regelkonform, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/twitter-sperrttitanic-magazin-wegen-storch-satire-15371919.html [https://perma.cc/3JCM-J9RY].
111
Sandra Schmitz-Berndt & Christian M. Berndt, The German Act on Improving Law
Enforcement on Social Networks: A Blunt Sword? 30–31 (Working Paper, Dec. 14, 2018).
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Meanwhile, the federal government approved two drafts to
amend the NetzDG.112 These proposals are intended to enhance
NetzDG’s regulatory approach. While the first one was signed into
law on March 30, 2021, it remains uncertain whether the second one
will come into force and, if so, when.113
C. Legal Background
This Article cannot expound all pertinent aspects of the German
legal framework. However, two pivotal subject areas—the right of
personality and fundamental rights—are addressed below.
1. Right of Personality
The NetzDG was enacted to ensure that claims arising from violations of personal rights were enforced. The right of personality is
not expressly regulated anywhere, but is protected by general principles of tort law and is violated, among other subsets, by insults and
disparagement.114 It protects the autonomous area of private life, in
which everyone can develop and maintain their individuality, so that
everyone can, for example, decide for themselves whether and to
what extent their life events get publicly presented.115 Violation of
the right to personality leads to a claim for injunctive relief.116 This
holds unquestionably true for a user who posts infringing content on
a social network’s platform. On the other hand, because it is the host
provider, the platform is not responsible for its user’s content.117
112

See discussion infra Sections III.B.3–4.
Id.
114
See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Feb. 26,
2015, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2022 (2015); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 15, 1989, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3028
(1989). For more on the German Right of Personality, see Ryan Kraski, Combating Fake
News in Social Media: U.S. and German Legal Approaches, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 923,
930–35 (2017).
115
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 5, 1973, 35
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 202, 220 (1974).
116
E.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Nürnberg Nov. 13, 2018,
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 190, 191 (2018).
117
Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BUNDESGESETZBLATT,
Tiel I [BGBL. I] at 251, § 10, sentence 1. This provision is based on article 14 of the ECommerce Directive. See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the
113
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This protection is afforded to the platforms provided that it has no
knowledge of the illegal content and it acts immediately to remove
or block access as soon as it becomes aware.118 Nonetheless, this
implies that the platform must act upon notice in order to avoid liability. On top of that, the Federal Court of Justice,119 the highest
German civil court, held in 2011 regarding an allegation of fact in a
blog post:
The host provider is only obliged to take action if the
reported information is so specific that the infringement can be easily affirmed on the basis of the allegations of the reporting person, i.e. without a thorough legal and factual examination…. As a rule, the
complaint of the reporting person must first be forwarded to the [posting user] for comment. If a statement is not made within a reasonable period of time,
the report shall be assumed to be justified and the reported post shall be deleted. If the [user] refutes the
complaint in a substantiated manner and if justified
doubts arise, the provider is, in general, obliged to
inform the reporting party and, if necessary, to demand evidence of the alleged infringement. If the reporting party fails to respond or fails to provide any
evidence that may be required, no further investigation will be initiated. If the reporting person’s response or the submitted evidence show an illegal violation of the right of personality, even taking into
account [the posting user’s] statement, the content in
question is to be deleted.120

Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in
Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13
[hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].
118
Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act] § 10.
119
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH).
120
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 25, 2011, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 148, 150–51 (2012); aff’d by Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice] Feb. 27, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2324, 2327
(2018).
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After all, if a violation of personal rights is committed by a user
on an Internet platform, the platform may not be directly responsible
for the violation.121 Nevertheless, it was already subject to certain
obligations prior to NetzDG.122
2. Fundamental Rights Involved
As in the United States, the legality of a German law is judged
by its constitution—the Grundgesetz.123 Various fundamental rights
granted by it are discussed in relation to the NetzDG. The debate
focuses on the Freedom of Expression and Information:124 “For
a free and democratic state order it is absolutely constitutive.”125
Numerous scholars are of the view that NetzDG violates the Freedom of Expression and Information and is, therefore, unconstitutional.126 Arguably, this is based on the concern that under the
NetzDG the platforms would, in case of doubt, tend to delete content
and, thus, prevent legal expressions of opinion.127 The UN Special
Rapporteur David Kaye had severe concerns for the integrity of both

121

See id. at 150 (holding that the platform neither wrote the blog post nor adopted its
content as its own).
122
Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 11.
123
Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], translation available at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/ [https://perma.cc/SDG9-FCGM].
124
Id. at Art. 5, para. 1.
125
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 198, 208 (1958).
However, false factual claims are not protected. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] June 3, 1980, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW]
2072, 2073 (1980). Also, the right of personality generally prevails in cases of insults and
vilification, i.e., when the defamation of the person is the main focus.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 8, 2017, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1460, 1460–61 (2017).
126
E.g., Nikolaus Guggenberger, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz—schön gedacht,
schlecht gemacht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 98, 100 (2017); Marc Liesching,
Die Durchsetzung von Verfassungs- und Europarecht gegen das NetzDG. Überblick über
die wesentlichen Kritikpunkte, 21 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 26, 27–28 (2018);
Fiete Kalscheuer & Christian Hornung, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz—Ein
verfassungswidriger Schnellschuss, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ]
1721, 1724 (2017).
127
See Gerald Spindler, Rechtsdurchsetzung von Persönlichkeitsrechten. Bußgelder
gegen Provider als Enforcement?, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT
[GRUR] 365, 366 (2018); infra Section V.C.
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the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy.128 Such
violations have yet to be found by a court. In fact, a lawsuit brought
by two politicians based on Freedom of Expression already failed
for procedural reasons.129
Since certain obligations are imposed on platforms, their occupational freedom is also affected.130 Although Facebook, in its statement on the NetzDG draft in 2017, opined that the Act is unconstitutional,131 all affected platforms have let the deadline for a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court132 expire.133
III. THE APPROACH OF EXTERNAL REGULATION: NETZDG

A. NetzDG’s Scope
NetzDG applies to social networks with at least two million users located in Germany.134 Moreover, platforms’ complaint procedure must only be carried out in case of particularly unlawful content.135 Hence, the Act’s scope is narrower than some might think.

128

Kaye, supra note 18, at 4.
Verwaltungsgericht Köln [VG] [Administrative Trial Court] Feb. 14, 2019,
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 342, 342 (2019).
130
Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Art. 12, para. 1; see also Gesetzentwurf der
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 21.
131
Stellungnahme zum Entwurf des Netswerkdurchsetzungsgestzes [Opinion on the Draft
of the Network Enforcement Act], FACEBOOK (May 30, 2017), https://www.bmjv.de/
SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Stellungnahmen/2017/Downloads/05242017_Stellu
ngnahme_Facebook_RefE_NetzDG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/
7UBL-3ZBR].
132
The Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) is the only German court that can void a
federal law.
133
Lena Isabell Löber & Alexander Roßnagel, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz in der
Umsetzung. Bilanz nach den ersten Transparenzberichten, 22 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT
[MMR] 71, 71 (2019). A constitutional complaint that challenges a law must be lodged
within one year of the law entering into force. See Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz
[BVERFGG] [Act on the Federal Constitutional Court], Aug. 11, 1993,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 1473, § 93, para. 3, translation available at
https://www.gesetze-im-Internet.de/englisch_bverfgg/englisch_bverfgg.html#p0408
[https://perma.cc/FCH6-4PPZ].
134
NetzDG § 1, para. 1, sentence 1, para. 2.
135
Id. § 1, para. 3, § 3, para. 1 and 2.
129
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1. Social Network
Social networks are defined as “telemedia service providers
which, for profit-making purposes, operate Internet platforms which
are designed to enable users to share any content with other users or
to make such content available to the public.”136 Neither platforms
offering journalistic or editorial content nor platforms which are designed to enable individual communication, such as email services,137 or the dissemination of specific content, such as business
and employment-oriented platforms,138 are considered social networks within the meaning of NetzDG.139 This also holds true for
online games and sales platforms.140
Obligations under the NetzDG only arise when the number of
registered users in Germany equals or exceeds two million.141 This
criterion was criticized as being too imprecise, because it remains
vague which users exactly fall under that definition, given that they
might disguise their location through a VPN.142 Moreover, no period
of time is indicated within which this criterion must be fulfilled.143
However, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook clearly meet the requirement.144

136

Id. § 1, para. 1, sentence 1.
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 18.
138
Id. at 19.
139
NetzDG § 1, para. 1, sentence 1.
140
Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the
Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 18.
141
NetzDG § 1, para. 2.
142
Marc Liesching, § 1 NetzDG Scope of Application, in STRAFRECHTLICHE
NEBENGESETZE (Georg Erbs & Max Kohlhaas, 218th supplement 2018).
143
Gerald Spindler, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, 9 KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT
[K&R] 533, 534 (2017).
144
Furthermore, other platforms, such as TikTok, fall within NetzDG’s scope. See
TIKTOK, TIKTOK TRANSPARENCY REPORT (Feb. 24, 2021), available at
https://perma.cc/NNE4-QCTY. This Article, however, focuses on the three surely most
important and famous social networks: YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.
137
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2. Unlawful Content
The obligations of social networks under the NetzDG with respect to a certain complaint procedure only refer to unlawful content.145 This includes the content being indictable pursuant to particular listed statutes in the German Penal Code, e.g., use of symbols
of unconstitutional organizations,146 forming terrorist organizations,
incitement of masses (sedition),147 including denial of the Holocaust,148 child pornography, insult, malicious gossip, defamation,
violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images,
and threatening commission of serious criminal offense.149 For example, the link in a post to the article “Merkel Regime Wants to Expropriate Land from Citizens in Order to Build Houses for Illegals”
was unlawful.150 It was illegal because the article incited masses,
where refugees and asylum seekers were described as “sex and violence tourists” and as “African drug dealers or rapists” and it was
claimed that “no normal person wants to have illegal asylum seekers
as direct neighbors.”151

145

NetzDG § 3, para. 1.
An example of a symbol of an unconstitutional organization is the Nazi swastika.
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Frankfurt, Mar. 18, 1998, NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 356 (1999).
147
This may include slurs that go beyond mere expressions of rejection and contempt
that incite a hostile attitude, such that these expressions constitute the incitement of hatred.
An example is insulting someone as a “cheeky Jew functionary”, because the term “cheeky
Jew” (“frecher Jude”) is part of the characteristic vocabulary of the Nazi language.
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Hamm, Jan. 28, 2020, 3 RVs 1/20,
aff’d, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 7, 2020,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 297 (2021).
148
Holocaust denial is indictable under STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE],
§ 130, para. 3, translation available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/
englisch_stgb.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GDN-WMF4] (“Whoever publicly or in a meeting
approves of, denies or downplays an act committed under the rule of National Socialism
of the kind indicated in section 6(1) of the Code of Crimes against International Law in a
manner which is suitable for causing a disturbance of the public peace incurs a penalty of
imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine.”).
149
NetzDG § 1, para. 3 (referring to, among other sections, STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB]
[PENAL CODE], §§ 86a, 129a, 130, 184b, 185, 185, 187, 201, and 241). For more on the
German Speech-Related Criminal Codes, see Kraski, supra note 114, at 938–40.
150
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Sept. 17, 2018, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3119, 3121–22 (2018).
151
Id.
146
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However, it is important to point out that not everything one
might call hate speech or fake news falls within the scope of the
NetzDG. One of the listed offenses must necessarily be present.152
Hence, particularly in the fight against fake news, it was clear from
the outset that the NetzDG can only make a limited contribution.153
A mere false assertion of a fact is not punishable per se but is only
indictable under very specific circumstances.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize (and is often neglected) that the removal and blocking obligations for platforms, as
explained above, already result from general legal principles154 and
that the NetzDG is only intended to regulate practical enforcement
(i.e., the procedure).155 This is expressly provided for in the legislation materials.156 Thus, the NetzDG does not “introduce a new liability regime nor does it render previously legal speech illegal. It
rather sets up a compliance regime [for] complaints managements.”157 Besides, this is reflected by the Act’s title, Network Enforcement Act.
Consequently, in criminal offenses without the involvement of
personal rights interests (e.g., use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations), there is no claim for removal or blocking. But in the
event of failure to delete the illegal content, potential regulatory consequences through fines may follow.158
B. Procedure for Handling Complaints
In handing complaints, platforms first check for a violation of
their own guidelines.159 If they find any infringement, they delete

152

NetzDG § 1, para. 3.
Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 74.
154
Supra Section II.C.1.
155
Alexander Schiff, Meinungsfreiheit in mediatisierten digitalen Räumen. Das NetzDG
auf dem Prüfstand des Verfassungsrechts, 21 MULIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 366, 367
(2018).
156
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 22.
157
Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 16.
158
NetzDG § 4.
159
For those guidelines, see infra Part IV.
153
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the content across all countries; if not, they check for blocking on
the basis of the NetzDG, which then only takes place in Germany.160
1. Statutory Standards
NetzDG regulates proceedings to remove or block certain unlawful posts. Removal means that the content is deleted worldwide,
whereas blocked content is unavailable only for users with a German
IP address.161
Social networks must “maintain an effective and transparent
procedure for handling complaints about unlawful content” and
provide “users with an easily recognizable, directly accessible and
permanently available procedure for submitting complaints.”162 The
procedure must ensure that complaints are immediately addressed
and checks are carried out.163 The report must be noted by someone
who is authorized to delete and block content.164 Management must
monitor the processing of complaints and offer training courses to
the concerned employees.165 Both the complainant and the user who
posted the content must be notified about any decision rendered.166
Every registered user may avail themselves of this complaint procedure. However, people outside the social network cannot, even if
they are affected by illegal content—they can only rely on their tortbased claim.167 As a result, one needs to create an account in order
to benefit from the complaint procedure, which seems odd.

160
E.g., Removals Under the Network Enforcement Law, GOOGLE, https://transparency
report.google.com/netzdg/youtube?hl=en [https://perma.cc/6RY7-6F4Y] (“If the content
violates our YouTube Community Guidelines we remove it globally. If the content does
not fall under these policies, but we identify it as illegal according to one of the 21 statutes
of the StGB to which NetzDG refers (§ 1 III NetzDG) or any other local law, we locally
restrict it.”).
161
Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 18. Thus, the social network platforms
opt for “blocking” if content does not infringe their self-imposed guidelines, but does
infringe Section 1, paragraph 3 of the NetzDG.
162
NetzDG § 3, para. 1.
163
Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 1.
164
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 22.
165
NetzDG § 3, para. 4.
166
Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 5.
167
Nikolaus Guggenberger, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz in der Anwendung, 36
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2577, 2581 (2017).
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Regardless, manifestly unlawful content must get removed or
blocked within twenty-four hours of receiving the complaint.168
According to NetzDG’s legislative materials, a post is manifestly
unlawful “if an in-depth examination is not necessary to find the unlawfulness.”169 This arguably applies, for instance, to insults using
swear words. On the other hand, it is not manifestly unlawful if
doubts remain in fact or in law.170 The social network, however, can
also reach an agreement with the competent law enforcement authority to extend the period of time in which they must delete or
block any manifestly unlawful content.171
Content that is not manifestly unlawful must be banned immediately—unverzüglich—and generally within seven days of receiving the complaint.172 It is worth mentioning here that unverzüglich
is an established term in German civil law and defined by the Civil
Code as “without culpable delay”—“ohne schuldhaftes Zögern.”173
Depending on the specific circumstances, a period greater than
seven days may be deemed appropriate.174 If the content refers to
factual circumstances, the social network can give the user an opportunity to respond to the complaint and exceed the seven-day time
limit.175 If the opportunity for the user to respond remains unused,
the social network may assume that the complaint is correct and remove the content; if, on the other hand, the user defends themself,
the network must weigh up the credibility of conflicting claims.176
168

NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 2.
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 22.
170
Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the
Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 20.
171
NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 2.
172
Id. § 3, para. 2, no. 3.
173
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 121, para. 1, sentence 1,
translation available at https://perma.cc/2Z25-2F2K. The above-mentioned English
language version of the NetzDG (supra note 7) is unfortunately somewhat imprecise in this
respect, as it does not correspond terminologically to the English translation of the BGB
published by the Federal Ministry of Justice.
174
NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 3; see also Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses
[Resolution Recommendation of the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 20.
175
NetzDG § 3, para. 2, no. 3a.
176
Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the
Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 21.
169
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2. Data on Previous Bans
In addition to the above, social networks must provide the public
with other information, including complaints received, removals,
and bans imposed.177 So far, social networks have published five
transparency reports for the two halves of 2018 and 2019, respectively, and the first half of 2020.178 YouTube also published its
report for the second half of 2020.179
In those years, YouTube counted 1,757,303 reported items.180
Of these items, it removed 420,307,181 which results in 23.92% of
items being removed, most of them “defamation or insults” or “hate
speech or political extremism.”182 In the second half of 2020,
YouTube processed 64,774 of 73,477complaints within twenty-four
hours, or 88.15%.183 During this period, only 1,865 posts were
blocked on basis of NetzDG, whereas 71,612 were blocked on the
basis of YouTube’s Community Guidelines,184 resulting in
NetzDG’s share of not more than 2.6%. The NetzDG complaints
Facebook received in 2018, 2019, and the first half of 2020 concerned just 14,114 items,185 4,431 of which were deleted186—a rate
of 31.39%. Here, too, most of the blockings were carried out within
twenty-four hours.187 Facebook, as opposed to YouTube, does not
publish its data on complaints and removals in their NetzDG reports

177

NetzDG § 2.
This Article focuses on the three most important social networks: YouTube,
Facebook, and Twitter. Other platforms fall within NetzDG’s scope as well. Supra note
144.
179
Removals under the Network Enforcement Law, supra note 160.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
FACEBOOK, NETZDG TRANSPARENCY REPORT § 3 (July 2018–July 2020)
https://www.facebook.com/help/285230728652028 [https://perma.cc/C9KU-3SVT]. The
number of complaints on Facebook is probably much lower because a report based on the
NetzDG cannot be made directly at the post, where, by contrast, a report based on the
Community Standards could be made. Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 36.
After all, the fine imposed on Facebook in 2019 was also motivated by the fact that the
reporting form was too hidden. See infra Section III.E.
186
FACEBOOK, supra note 185, at § 7.
187See id. at § 8.
178
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but only on a worldwide basis, because of its Community Standards.188 This makes a comparison to NetzDG blocking very difficult.
Twitter received 2,633,986 complaints189 with 357,985 of them being successful, or 13.59%.190 After all, in 2018 and 2019, a total of
2,921,553 complaints were submitted to all social networks affected
by the NetzDG, of which about 28% resulted in blockings.191
3. Cooperation with Authorities
On February 19, 2020, the German federal government approved a draft amendment to the NetzDG that primarily introduced
an obligation for social media to report removed and blocked content to the Federal Criminal Police Office192 if some of the offenses
listed in NetzDG, section 1, paragraph 3 have been committed.193
These offenses include incitement of the masses, but does not include insult.194 In addition to the posted content, the report shall also
include the user’s IP address if known.195 A fine may be imposed
on social networks if the procedure for transmitting the reports is
not set up.196 The Federal Criminal Police Office is expected to
transmit the information to the locally competent authority for criminal prosecution.197

188

See
FACEBOOK,
COMMUNITY
STANDARDS
ENFORCEMENT
REPORT,
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement [https://perma.cc/
H3GE-RXZJ].
189
See TWITTER, NETWORK ENFORCEMENT ACT REPORT, (Jan. 2018-June 2020)
https://transparency.twitter.com/de/countries/de.html [https://perma.cc/9E63-LCXX].
190
See id.
191
See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 19/17741, supra note 92, at 14.
192
See Frank Jordans, Germany: Bill Requires Sites to Report Hate Speech to Police,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 19, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ef38dbeb3c0d026e65f
5dde6edeb3837 [https://perma.cc/PG2L-FB74].
193
See Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’
Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 13–14. This obligation will
be enshrined in the future NetzDG § 3a.
194
Id. at 15. These offences will be enumerated by the future NetzDG § 3a, para. 2, no. 3.
195
Id. at 14. This will be stated by the future NetzDG § 3a, para. 4, no. 2.
196
Id.16. This will be stated by the future NetzDG § 4, para. 1, no. 6a.
197
Id. at 15.
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Some had already postulated that kind of cooperation between
social media platform and criminal authorities before.198 On March
10, 2020, the two governing parties introduced the draft into parliament,199 where it was passed on June 18, 2020 without amendments
to the NetzDG.200 After the draft had been updated,201 the German
head of state, the Bundespräsident, signed it into law on March 30,
2021. Most of the amendments to the NetzDG will come into force
on February 1, 2022.202
4. Review Procedure?
On April 27, 2020, the government followed this first proposal
with another draft amendment.203 Similar to previous proposals, this
draft includes an obligation for social networks to provide an easily
recognizable procedure by which decisions on complaints can be reviewed.204 Both the user and the complainant can appeal under that
procedure within fourteen days of the decision.205 The opposing
party must be given the opportunity to respond, and names will not

198

See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 75; Jan Christian Sahl & Nils Bielzer,
NetzDG 2.0—Ein Update für weniger Hass im Netz, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK
[ZRP] 2, 3 (2020).
199
See Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’
Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 14.
200
See Gesetz gegen Rechtsextremismus und Hasskriminalität beschlossen, DEUTSCHER
BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN, https://www.bundestag.de/#url=L2Rva3VtZW50ZS90ZXh0
YXJjaGl2LzIwMjAva3cyNS1kZS1yZWNodHNleHRyZW1pc211cy03MDExMDQ=&m
od=mod493054 [https://perma.cc/CUG3-5MHA].
201
See Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Kleine Anfrage [Governmental Answer
to an Inquiry], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/23867, 3,
https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/238/1923867.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4S9-FV46].
202 See Art. 10(2) Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der
Hasskriminalität [Law on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crime], March
30, 2021, BGBL at 441 (Ger.).
203
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 1, https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/187/1918792
.pdf [https://perma.cc/59QG-V9XD].
204
An evaluation commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Justice as well as Sahl &
Bielzer had already called for this procedure. See EIFERT ET AL.,
NETZWERKDURCHSETZUNGSGESETZ IN DER BEWÄHRUNG 195 (1 Aufl. 2020); see also Sahl
& Bielzer, supra note 198, at 4.
205
See Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 9.
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be disclosed.206 Thus, the government intends to explicitly enable a
put-back claim, which several scholars had been calling for.207 Furthermore, there exists the possibility that disputes be brought before
private arbitration boards. The parliament has not discussed that proposal yet.
C. Self-Regulating Institution
The seven-day time limit does not apply if the social network
refers the decision to a recognized self-regulating institution within
seven days of receiving the initial complaint.208 The social network
fulfills its obligation by handing the complaints over to the institution.209 Facebook’s recently founded Oversight Board, to which Facebook and its users can refer cases for review and whose decisions
are binding, is arguably an example of such an institution.210
For the purpose of this alternative procedure, the relevant administrative authority211 will recognize such an institution under certain conditions.212 In January 2020, for the first time, the Federal
Office of Justice acknowledged a private organization as a self-regulating institution under the NetzDG.213 In order to determine if an
institution fits this definition, it must be reviewed by a panel which

206

Id. at 10.
See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 75; Alexander Peukert, Gewährleistung
der Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit in sozialen Netzwerken. Vorschlag für eine
Ergänzung des NetzDG um sog. Put-back-Verfahren, 21 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR]
572, 572 (2018); Schiff, supra note 155, at 366. Contra Sandra Niggemann, Die NetzDGNovelle, COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 326, 330 (2020). So far, such a claim is accorded by
the courts based on general principles, but not explicitly stipulated. See discussion infra
Section IV.B.
208
See NetzDG § 3. This does not apply, however, to manifestly unlawful content. See
Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of the Legal
Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 21.
209
See id. at 21.
210
See Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent
Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (Sept. 17, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/
oversight-board-structure/ [https://perma.cc/56US-2NDK].
211
See Press Release, Bundesamt für Justiz [BfJ] [Federal Office of Justice], Erstmals
Selbstregulierung nach dem Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (Jan. 23, 2020), available at
https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/Presse/Archiv/2020/20200123.html [https://perma.
cc/3T76-8BBX].
212
See NetzDG § 3.
213
See BfJ, supra note 211.
207
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consists of fifty lawyers, forming committees of three members.214
So far, Facebook and Google have joined that institution.215
D. Reporting Obligation
Many deplore the lack of transparency with respect to platforms’
handling of complaints.216 NetzDG aimed to address that issue: if a
social network receives more than 100 complaints per calendar year,
it must publish in the Federal Gazette—as well as on its website—
half-yearly German-language reports on the handling of unlawful
content complaints, expounding several enumerated issues.217 Platforms’ biannual reports must include a description of the established
proceedings, staffing numbers, the numbers of incoming complaints, and executed removals or blockings.218
E. Regulatory Fines
The relevant administrative authority may impose a regulatory
fine for actions or omissions including failure to produce a correct
transparency report219 or failure to correctly provide a procedure for
dealing with complaints under the NetzDG.220 The central concept
of this regulation is that only systematic—or persistent221—violations by social networks can be sanctioned.222 Thus, a simple error
in judging a post does not expose the social network to fines. Nor

214

See NetzDG, FREIWILLIGE SELBSTKONTROLLE MULTIMEDIA-DIENSTEANBIETER [FSM]
[ASSOCIATION FOR VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION OF DIGITAL MEDIA SERVICE
PROVIDERS], https://www.fsm.de/en/netzdg#N1 [https://perma.cc/7P9W-RB45].
215
See WILLIAM ECHIKSON & OLIVIA KNODT, GERMANY’S NETZDG: A KEY TEST FOR
COMBATTING ONLINE HATE 12 (Nov. 22, 2018).
216
See e.g., Klonick, supra note 21, at 1665.
217
See NetzDG § 2.
218
See id.
219
See NetzDG § 4.
220
See id.
221
See Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of
the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 22.
222
See Spindler, supra note 127, at 365; Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 99; Echikson
& Knodt, supra note 215, at 4; Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 19; see also
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 18/12356, supra note 95, at 24–25;
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 18/12727, supra note 103, at 27;
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 19/18792, supra note 203, at 51.
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does a misjudgment of a statement’s credibility to justify a complaint or the response cause a fine.223
The maximum fine is €50 million, approximately $55 million as
of writing this Article.224 As stated, this is the maximum, not the
rule. The exact fine is determined according to guidelines laid out
by the relevant agency.225 These guidelines are general administrative principles on the exercise of that authority’s discretion regarding whether to impose a fine and how to calculate it.226 According
to these guidelines, cases that are difficult to decide legally—e.g.,
sharp statements in political opinion campaigns—do not result in
fines.227 The calculation of the fine is based on certain parameters,
such as network’s registered number of users, economic circumstances, and whether the circumstances and consequences of the offense are deemed light, medium, serious, very serious, or extremely
serious.228 In July 2019, the authority imposed a fine on Facebook
of €2 million based on its flawed transparency report for the first
half of 2018 and the reporting form being “too hidden” for its
users.229
The federal government’s draft amendment to the NetzDG from
April 2020 proposes that the supervisory administrative authority
shall, in addition to its capacity to impose fines, be able to take other

223

See Beschlussempfehlung des Rechtsausschusses [Resolution Recommendation of
the Legal Committee], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/13013, 21.
224
See NetzDG § 4; GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN [OWIG] [ACT ON
REGULATORY OFFENSES], § 30, para. 2.
225
See NetzDG § 4; Bundesamt für Justiz [BfJ] [Federal Office of Justice], Leitlinien
Bußgelder [NetzDG Fine Guidelines], 1, available at https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/
DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/NetzDG/Leitlinien_Geldbussen_de.pdf?__blob=publicati
onFile&v=6 [https://perma.cc/8VCF-K9D9].
226
Id. at 2.
227
See id.at 10.
228
See id. at 13–14.
229
See Press Release, Federal Office of Justice, Federal Office of Justice Issues Fine
Against Facebook (July 3, 2019), available at https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/
DE/Presse/Archiv/2019/20190702_EN.html;jsessionid=CD4C0964D478984E72B7794B
5BF8EA81.1_cid394?nn=3451904 [https://perma.cc/D4UX-M9XE].
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“necessary measures” and oblige the platform to remedy the infringement.230 This way, the authority can refrain from immediately
charging fines, and can proceed with caution instead.
IV. THE APPROACH OF INTERNAL REGULATION: SELF-IMPOSED STANDARDS

Facebook’s Community Standards,231 YouTube’s Community
Guidelines,232 and Twitter’s Rules and Policy233 contain self-imposed terms of prohibited content. Those may or may not overlap
with NetzDG’s regulation of “unlawful content.” Facebook, for example, restricts the display of female breasts if the nipples are visible.234 German law, in general, does not compel that. Moreover,
self-imposed standards apply globally and provide the networks
with more potential measures in case of a violation, most notably
the blocking of an account or a read-only restriction, which does not
exist in the NetzDG. Regardless, the NetzDG does not preclude
more stringent regulations.235
Those self-imposed standards provide both the networks as well
as their user communities with advantages compared to external regulation. Self-framed rules will be easier to interpret and apply, which
promotes uniform enforcement. They might also enjoy greater acceptance because users consent to them when creating an account.
The existing self-imposed standards express a certain social and cor-

230

Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 13.
231
Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/
[https://perma.cc/DBL5-H294].
232
YouTube’s Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, https://creatoracademy.youtube.com
/page/course/community-guidelines [https://perma.cc/9HAC-VNGB].
233
The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitterrules [https://perma.cc/8TTZ-U97G].
234
See 14. Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/adult_nudity_sexual_activity
[https://perma.cc/S63C-R6QZ].
However, Facebook does allow images that depict protest actions or breastfeeding women,
or photos of scarring after breast amputations. Id.
235
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden Aug. 8, 2018, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3111, 3113 (2018); Oberlandesgericht [OLG]
[Higher Regional Court] Nürnberg Aug. 4, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND
MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 16, 24 (2021).
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porate responsibility and, even more importantly, are based on economic necessities.236 Platforms pursuing a sound business model
simply cannot afford a hostile environment on their sites as it will
deter many decent users.237
A. External Regulation of Internal Regulation
Under German law, the self-imposed standards are regarded as
general terms and conditions (“Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen,”
“AGB”) in the contractual relationship between user and platform.238
Such AGB are subject to intense regulation by the German Civil
Code and can be held void by courts in the event of a violation of
the regulations.239 However, the courts have upheld No. 12 of Face-

236

Klonick, supra note 21, at 1615, 1617–18, 1625 (“[P]latforms have created a
voluntary system of self-regulation because they are economically motivated to create a
hospitable environment for their users in order to incentivize engagement. This selfregulation involves both reflecting the norms of their users around speech as well as
keeping up as much speech as possible. Online platforms also self-regulate for reasons of
social and corporate responsibility, which in turn reflect free speech norms.”).
237
Id. at 1627 (“Take down too much content and you lose not only the opportunity for
interaction, but also the potential trust of users. Likewise, keeping up all content on a site
risks making users uncomfortable and losing page views and revenue.”). Twitter is named
an example in that regard. Id. at 1629 (“As Twitter’s user growth stagnated, many blamed
the site’s inability to police harassment, hate speech, and trolling on its site for the slump.”).
238
Facebook’s Terms of Service, for instance, explicitly refer to its Community
Standards. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms
[https://perma.cc/E8DX-REMX]. Yet, German courts usually do not draw a distinction in
that regard, and deem the self-imposed rules as terms and conditions, no matter where they
are laid down. E.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7,
2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 79 , 81 (2021) (referring to No. 5 of Facebook’s
Terms of Service); Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Frankenthal, Sept. 8, 2020,
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 85, 85–86 (2021) (referring to Facebook’s Community
Standards); see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden Dec. 11,
2019, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUMRD] 2, 3–4 (2021) (considering No. 12 of Facebook’s Community Standards and No. 3.2
of its Terms of Service); OLG Nürnberg, ZUM-RD 16, 20 (stating that users’ obligations
are circumscribed in Facebook’s Terms of Service and further defined in the Community
Standards).
239
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], §§ 305–10, translation available at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ [https://perma.cc/BGC6-C7QV].
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book’s Community Standards on hate speech; this provision is neither “surprising,”240 “opaque,”241 nor “disproportionate.”242 To
name a few examples, Facebook deleted the following posts based
on its Community Standards; these deletions were approved by
German courts in all five cases:
“From the experience made so far with Islam, the one more other
less, it is probably very clear that this human race243 does not fit into
the European culture.”244

240

OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3113 (2018); OLG Dresden, ZUM-RD 2, 3–4;
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe Feb. 28, 2019, MULTIMEDIA
UND RECHT [MMR] 52, 54 (2020); see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional
Court] Stuttgart Sept. 6, 2018, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 273,
276 (2019). A “surprising clause” is invalid pursuant to BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
[BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 305c, para. 1.
241
OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3113; OLG Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 54; Oberlandesgericht
[OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Nürnberg, Aug. 4, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND
MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 16, 24–25 (2021); Landgericht [LG]
[Regional Court] Stuttgart, Aug. 29, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 423, 423–24
(2020); Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Bremen June 20, 2029, MULTIMEDIA UND
RECHT [MMR] 426, 428 (2020); see also OLG Stuttgart, ZUM 2019, 273, 276;
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden, June 16, 2020, MULTIMEDIA
UND RECHT [MMR] 58, 59 (2021) (on Facebook’s Terms of Service). An “opaque clause”
is invalid pursuant to BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 307, para. 1,
sentence 2.
242
OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3113–14 (2018); OLG Nürnberg ZUM-RD 16, 24; OLG
Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 54; LG Bremen, MMR 426, 428; see also OLG Stuttgart, ZUM 273,
277 on Facebook’s Terms of Service). A disproportionate clause is invalid pursuant to
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 307, para. 1, sentence 1.
243
It is worth mentioning here that the German word “Rasse” is arguably used differently
in the German language than the word “race” in English. In Germany, that word is rather
taboo, probably because it was a frequently used term by the Nazi Regime for its inhuman
ideology. This association is why some have called for removing that term from the
German constitution. Hui Min Neo, Row in Germany over ‘Race’ in Constitution,
BARRON’S (June 12, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/news/row-in-germany-over-race-inconstitution-01591947605 [https://perma.cc/6NYH-ELCP]. So, too, the federal
government agreed on replacing that term in the constitution (“Rasse”-Begriff soll aus dem
Grundgesetz gestrichen werden, DUEUTSCHE WELLE (March. 5, 2021),
https://www.dw.com/de/rasse-begriff-soll-aus-dem-grundgesetz-gestrichen-werden/a56787404 [https://p.dw.com/p/3qGzs].
244
OLG Dresden, NJW 3111, 3112 (confirming the removal, as the statement assumes
that the claimed inferiority is related to their uniform genetic disposition and is, therefore,
unchangeable).
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“Refugees: detain until they voluntarily leave the country!”245
“As Nostradamus said: over the sea they will come like locusts,
but they will not be animals…how right was the man.”246
“We owe nothing to the Africans and Arabs. They have destroyed their continents by corruption, sloppiness, unrestrained reproduction, and tribal and religious wars, and now they are taking
away from us what we have diligently built.”247
“You [i.e., Chancellor Merkel] have intentionally and unlawfully imported terror, war, poverty, and death by illegal asylum-freeloaders, hundreds of thousands of mercenaries, IS terrorists and
other serious criminals into our country…. Public events now have
to be massively secured, fenced in and secured by policemen with
machine guns because of YOUR ILLEGAL GUESTS. Now there
are protection zones for women who seek shelter from those seeking
protection, so that they do not continue to become victims of sexual
assault through YOUR DISINHIBITED GUESTS. Every day
YOUR GUESTS commit violent crimes.”248
However, one court ruled that an expression of opinion permitted by law could not be removed on the basis of community standards which it deemed void.249 Other courts strongly disagree with
245Oberlandesgericht

[OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe, June 25, 2018, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3110, 3111 (2018) (confirming the removal, as the
statement went beyond “mere criticism and discussion of the immigration laws”).
246
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Stuttgart, Sept. 6, 2018,
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 273, 276 (2019) (confirming the
removal, because the post equates refugees with locusts, i.e., masses of voracious vermin).
247
OLG Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 53 (confirming the removal, as the statement ascribed
moral deficits to these people on the sole basis of their membership of the ethnic group).
248 OLG München, MMR 79, 81–82 (confirming the removal, holding the post an
incitement of masses under STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 130 because all
asylum seekers are described without differentiation as freeloaders and serious criminals.
Thus, the post denies the social claim to human dignity. Moreover, this statement may, on
the one hand, promote aggression towards certain people and, on the other, fear or
insecurity among those).
249
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Aug. 24, 2018, NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3115, 3116 (2018). Confirmed by OLG München,
ZUM 548, 554–57 (holding valid, however, Facebook’s contractual authority to ban
hatred); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7, 2020,
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 79, 81–82 (2021); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher
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this notion because hate speech threatens to “brutalize morals,”
which might have a general negative impact on the exchange of
opinions via social networks and, thus, also calls the business model
of a social network into question.250 Consequently, platforms must
be allowed a certain margin of discretion.251 German courts are,
therefore, somewhat inconsistent as regards the extent to which social media providers can regulate content posted on their platforms.
Provided the self-imposed standards are valid, courts evaluate
whether a post infringes those guidelines. One court, for instance,
held that the statement, “I cannot compete with you argumentatively, you are unarmed and that would not be very fair of me” does
not violate Facebook’s Community Standards.252 Another court interpreted YouTube’s Community Guidelines on hate speech rather
narrowly, concluding that the term “knife immigration” (“MesserEinwanderung”) may imply that refugees commit acts of violence
using knives but does not stir up hatred against persons on account
of their origin.253 Moreover, a court found the “Erklärung 2018”
(“Declaration 2018”), a petition criticizing mass immigration, not to
be hate speech and, thus, the declaration permissible.254 Likewise,
the satiric recommendation for voters of Germany’s far-right party
Regional Court] München, Feb. 18, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT
RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 8, 13 (2021). Nonetheless, the court allowed
Facebook to remove hate speech infringing its Community Standards. Id. at 85. Other
courts agreed that an expression of opinion permitted by law cannot be removed on the
basis of community standards but considered those terms and conditions valid nonetheless.
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Oldenburg, July 1, 2019, MULTIMEDIA
UND RECHT [MMR] 41, 42 (2020); Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Bamberg Oct. 18,
2018, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 56, 58 (2019).
250
OLG Karlsruhe, MMR 52, 53; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court]
Dresden Aug. 8, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3111, 3114; see also
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dresden, Apr. 7, 2020, MULTIMEDIA
UND RECHT [MMR] 626, 626 (2020); LG Stuttgart, MMR 423, 425 (2020); Landgericht
[LG] [Regional Court] Bremen, June 20, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 426, 428
(2020).
251
Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Frankenthal, Sept. 8, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND
RECHT [MMR] 85, 86 (2021).
252
OLG München, NJW 3115, 3117 (2018). In the case of an unjustified ban, German
courts grant a claim for remediation. See infra Section IV.B.
253
Kammergericht [KG [Higher Regional Court] Mar. 22, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND
RECHT [MMR] 47, 48 (2020).
254
LG Bamberg, MMR 56, 58–59. On the Declaration, see Erklärung 2018, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erkl%C3%A4rung_2018 [https://perma.cc/Y95X-MUJ7].
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to sign their ballots (which would void them under German law),
ending with a winking emoticon, could not be banned by Twitter.255
After all, German courts have so far been more concerned with
validity, interpretation, and application of the self-imposed standards than with the NetzDG, highlighting the greater importance of
these questions in legal practice compared to the NetzDG. However,
the self-imposed standards do not cancel out the NetzDG. Notably,
the social networks must still observe NetzDG’s deadlines—e.g., to
process a user complaint.
B. Unjustified Bans
Even though the deletion of content, which is neither prohibited
by the self-imposed standards nor covered by the NetzDG, is to be
reduced as much as possible, the question arises whether users can
demand remediation. Under current US law, they cannot (provided
that the platform acted in good faith),256 whereas the legislative materials on the NetzDG allude to such a claim.257 Although it is not
explicitly stated, German courts grant such claims based on general
principles of law. If a ban is unjustified, they confer a claim based
on the contract between the user and the social network, which is
concluded upon the registration of a personal profile on the platform, without evaluating the provider’s good faith.258 Additionally,
courts can grant an interim injunction in order to enforce the claim
255

Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Nürnberg-Fürth, June 7, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND
RECHT [MMR] 541 (2019).
256
CDA § 230.
257
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 23 (stating that nobody need
accept that their legitimate statements are removed from social networks).
258
See e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7, 2020,
MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 79, 83 (2021); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher
Regional Court] Dresden, Apr. 7, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 626, 626 (2020);
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Jan. 7, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 548, 560 (2020); KG MMR 47, 47 (2020);
Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Frankfurt, Sept. 3, 2020, KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT
[K&R] 128, 129–30 (2021). On conclusion of contract see Oberlandesgericht [OLG]
[Higher Regional Court] Dresden, Aug. 8, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW] 3111, 3112 (2018); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München,
Aug. 24, 2018, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3115, 3116 (2018);
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] München, Feb. 18, 2020, ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT RECHTSPRECHUNGSDIENST [ZUM-RD] 8, 13 (2021).
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rapidly.259 That claim also applies to unjustified blockings based on
NetzDG.
V. CONTROVERSIES ABOUT REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA

Much of the NetzDG criticism reflects concerns over the general
external regulation of social media.260 Therefore, it is a suitable forum for discussing this approach.
A. Deserved Control
The NetzDG is based mainly on the consideration that illegal
circumstances are perpetuated more strongly on the Internet than in
traditional media261 due to the “effects of defamation on the Internet,
especially given the ease, scope and speed of the dissemination of
information.”262 Today, this is even more accurate than twenty-five
years ago when CDA Section 230 was enacted.263 Nowadays, many
applicants for jobs are first Googled and searched for on social networks.264 “The anonymity, amplification, and aggregation possibilities offered by the Internet have allowed private actors to discriminate, harass, and threaten vulnerable groups on a massive scale.”265
At the same time, a study in 2020 showed that social media may
affect real-life actions by proving links between online posts and
anti-refugee incidents in Germany.266

259
E.g., OLG München, NJW 3115, 2018; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional
Court] Oldenburg, July 1, 2019, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 41 (2020); OLG
Dresden, MMR 626 (2020); LG Nürnberg-Fürth, MMR 541 (2019).
260
It is, for instance, generally concerned that a legal obligation to ban certain content
would result in excessive censorship. See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 9, at 265.
261
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 21. This is criticized as to CDA
Section 230. Saint, supra note 83, at 44 (“Internet defamation has a far greater potential to
harm than defamation in printed materials.”).
262
Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, App. No.
22947/13 (2016), [https://perma.cc/QDK6-F9XS].
263
See Chu, supra note 83 (providing several instances for how the Internet and its use
have changed over time, concluding that this demands a change in law as well).
264
Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 412.
265
Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 19.
266
Karsten Müller & Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and
Hate Crime, J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N, at 2 (2020).
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Unfortunately, sometimes platforms do not treat all users
equally, but rather privilege celebrities. For example, Facebook
privileged then-presidential candidate Donald Trump during his
2016 campaign by leaving posts which had clearly violated the platform’s standards untouched.267 Facebook has since been severely
criticized for being too lenient with Trump.268 A law could prevent
that. Additionally, it would provide a complementary remedy based
on the provider-imposed standards for cases in which the internal
regulation fails for whatever reason. And even though some users
might be more willing to accept content moderation based on rules
they consented to when initially creating an account,269 a law enacted by Congress would put content removals on a democratic footing.270
B. Cheapest Cost Avoider
From an economic point of view, accountability of Internet intermediaries is grounded on the notion of the cheapest cost avoider
or least-cost avoider.271 It should be noted that the party who can
prevent the infringement by the simplest and most convenient means
is the posting user.272 However, if that party de facto cannot be held
267

Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Id.
269
Supra Part IV.
270
Wu, supra note 38, at 2022 (“Nor can we ignore the fact that what counts as acceptable
speech for billions of people around the world is currently being decided by a relatively
small group of private actors in Northern California.”).
271
See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary
Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 307 (2005) (concluding that “[w]hen
intermediaries have the technological capability to prevent harmful transactions and when
the costs of doing so are reasonable in relation to the harm prevented, they should be
encouraged to do so—with the threat of formal legal sanction if that becomes necessary.”);
Ronen Perry & Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech: Comparative and
Economic Analyses, 5 J. EUR. TORT L. 205, 205–06 (2014) (concluding that imposing
liability on the provider is most efficient if the posting user is unavailable).
272
Gerhard Wagner, Haftung von Plattformen für Rechtsverletzungen (Teil 1),
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 329, 338 (2020); see also
Kosseff, supra note 45, at 152 (“Although it is easier––and possibly more lucrative––to
sue the website on which defamatory content appeared rather than an anonymous
individual, it is fairer to seek compensation from the individual who actually created the
allegedly harmful content…. Imposing liability on intermediaries, rather than on the parties
who created the content, does not adequately accomplish [protecting individuals’ interests
and maximizing society’s benefits].”).
268
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liable for reasons of anonymity and/or enforcement difficulties, the
service providers are targeted.273 They must stop the infringement
to avert further damage that outweighs the costs of content moderation. Apart from the overall problem that a judgment against the
posting user often comes too late and is difficult to enforce in other
countries, German law explicitly provides for anonymity on the Internet.274 NetzDG can be regarded as a counterweight of this.
C. Potential Over-blocking (Collateral Censorship)
A major concern about requiring Internet providers to engage in
content moderation by law is referred to as collateral censorship: “A
censors B out of fear that the government will hold A liable for the
effects of B’s speech.”275 Likewise, the most common criticism of
NetzDG is the risk of over-blocking due to the threat of fines of up
to €50 million, which would provide an incentive for deletion in

273

Balkin, supra note 45, at 434 (“Not only are these entities likely to have deeper
pockets, they are also probably easier to find.”); Wu, supra note 44, at 300
(“[I]ntermediaries can control the speech they carry. Moreover, they can easily be
identified, unlike users, who might use pseudonyms and communicate online without
directly identifying themselves. Intermediaries can easily be sued, unlike users who might
reside in a foreign jurisdiction, outside the reach of U.S. courts.”).
274
Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act], § 13, para. 4; see Wagner, supra note
272, at 337; Spindler, supra note 127, at 373. One court, however, ruled that a social
network is entitled, in order to prevent unlawful behavior, to require the use of real names
and to block the user account in the event of violations. OBERLANDESGERICHT [OLG]
[HIGHER REGIONAL COURT] München, Dec. 8, 2020, 18 U 2822/19 Pre (2020).
275
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2296 (1999); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove
messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not.”); Balkin, supra
note 45, at 436 (“The same is true for online versions of newspapers and magazines which
now allow readers to respond by posting comments. Without section 230, many website
operators would simply disable these features.”); Note, supra note 45, at 2036 (“[E]xposing
internet intermediaries to liability for defamation communicated by their users would lead
to collateral censorship.”); Wu, supra note 44, at 308 (“[W]hen faced with liability for
carrying particular content, the intermediary continues to have an incentive to censor when
the original speaker would not, because it loses little or nothing for doing so, while the
original speaker loses all of the benefits of that content.”).
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questionable cases.276 In the legislative process, this concern was already addressed by the Bundesrat.277 Nevertheless, the government
intended to reduce the risk of over-blocking by allowing social networks to solicit a statement from the user and, if necessary, an external expert’s opinion.278
Some have expressed doubts about the thesis of over-blocking
early on.279 After all, as shown above, only a systematic violation
leads to a fine.280 Besides, the data provided by transparency reports
does not indicate an excessive deletion of content.281 A study on the
effect of NetzDG within the first six months concluded that the Act:
[H]as not provoked mass requests for takedowns.
Nor has it forced Internet platforms to adopt a ‘take
down, ask later’ approach…. At the same time, it remains uncertain whether NetzDG has achieved sig-

276

Spindler, supra note 127, at 366; Liesching, supra note 126, at 27; Guggenberger,
supra note 167, at 2580; Sebastian Müller-Franken, Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz:
Selbstbehauptung des Rechts oder erster Schritt in die selbstregulierte Vorzensur? –
Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE MEDIENRECHT [AFP] 1, 8–
10 (2018); Karl-Heinz Ladeur & Tobias Gostomzyk, Das Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz
und die Logik der Meinungsfreiheit, KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT [K&R] 390, 392–93
(2017); Diana Lee, Germany’s NetzDG and the Threat to Online Free Speech, Yale L. Sch.
Media & Freedom Info. Access Clinic (Oct. 10, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/mfia/casedisclosed/germanys-netzdg-and-threat-online-free-speech
[https://perma.cc/QTD3U99K]; Kaye, supra note 18, at 4; Kaye, Wir schaffen das!, supra note 90; McMillan,
supra note 9, at 265, 287 (“The Network Enforcement Act is not proportionate because it
provides every incentive to over-police content with no oversight, and no equivalent
incentive to ensure that lawful content is not deleted….Although no evidence of overblocking has yet been found, there is a real concern that it may occur.”).
277
Regierungsentwurf
[Cabinet
Draft],
DEUTSCHER
BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12727, 16–17.
278
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 23.
279
E.g.,
Schiff,
supra
note
155,
at
370;
Karl-Nikolaus
Peifer,
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz: Selbstbehauptung des Rechts oder erster Schritt in die
selbstregulierte Vorzensur? – Zivilrechtliche Aspekte, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE
MEDIENRECHT [AFP] 14, 19–20 (2018).
280
See discussion supra Section III.E.
281
See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 73; Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note
111, at 36.
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nificant results in reaching its stated goal of preventing hate speech. Evidence suggests that platforms are
wriggling around strict compliance.282
Similarly, court rulings to date do not indicate that the platforms
block excessively or systematically and unjustifiably.283 Additionally, it should be noted that German courts, generally speaking,
grant a claim for remediation,284 which considerably reduces the incentive to delete content in case of doubt. It has been countered that
this put-back claim is too weak because it does not accord damages
and an interim injunction might come too late for urgent news.285
Yet, several published judgments show that some users take advantage of that claim by suing social networks,286 which puts pressure on those providers. More importantly, social media cannot afford removing content arbitrarily and on too large of a scale.287 For
economic reasons, they must find an appropriate balance of banning
daunting posts and keeping decent content in order to maintain a
pleasant environment.288
In sum, the initial fear appears unfounded.289

282

Echikson & Knodt, supra note 215, at i.
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
284
See discussion supra Section IV.B.
285
Gerhard Wagner, Haftung von Plattformen für Rechtsverletzungen (Teil 2),
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 447, 452 (2020).
286
See supra Section IV.A.
287
But see Wu, supra note 44, at 308 (“Thus, within limits, intermediaries can likely
obtain all or most of the advertising revenue they would otherwise obtain, while still
censoring speech.”).
288
Supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text.
289
Christoph Buchert, Ein Gewinn für den Rechtsstaat, LEGAL TRIB. ONLINE (Oct. 26,
2019), https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/pro-contra-netzdg-ein-gewinn-fuer-denrechtsstaat/ [https://perma.cc/D63N-8VXR]; Daniel Holznagel, Put-back-Ansprüche
gegen soziale Netzwerke: Quo Vadis?, COMPUTER UND RECHT [CR] 518, 523 (2019); Rolf
Schwartmann & Robin L. Mühlenbeck, NetzDG und das virtuelle Hausrecht sozialer
Netzwerke, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 170, 170 (2020); Gesetzentwurf der
Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741, 42; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft],
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 16. An evaluation commissioned
by the Federal Ministry of Justice in 2020 came to the same conclusion. EIFERT ET AL.,
supra note 204, at 78–80, 91.
283
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D. Chilling Effect
Others have argued that the NetzDG may have a chilling effect
on users, as users may fear removal of their posts and, thus, shy
away from making any statements.290 This would be particularly
problematic in view of the (fundamental) right to Freedom of Expression.
However, if this effect existed, it would be based on irrational
and erratic user behavior because they face liability regardless of the
NetzDG, which does not change the assessment of the criminal or
other liability for statements.291 The risk of criminal prosecution is
much more serious than that of blocking a post. It would, therefore,
be incomprehensible if users were to refrain from posting content
just because of the NetzDG. At best, it is conceivable that users
might fear that their accounts will be blocked or suspended. Yet, this
measure is not provided for by the NetzDG but can only be imposed
on the basis of self-imposed standards.292
In its recent draft amendment, the German federal government
contended that people affected by hate speech on the Internet might
get deterred from social or political commitment, or even withdraw
from discussions which would have a negative impact on the Freedom of Expression.293 A Pew Research survey of 4,248 US adults
found that 27% of the participants back off from posting online after
witnessing the harassment of others and 13% ceased using Internet
services after witnessing harassing actions.294 Similarly, according

290

Nunziato, supra note 9, at 1535; Müller-Franken, supra note 276, at 10; McMillan,
supra note 9, at 265; Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1359.
291
Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 28; Matthias Friehe, Löschen und
Sperren in sozialen Netzwerken, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1697, 1698
(2020).
292
See discussion supra Part IV. One court concluded that even the possibility of user
account deactivation due to hate speech and support of hate organizations under a social
network’s terms and conditions does not create a chilling effect. Oberlandesgericht [OLG]
[Higher Regional Court] Dresden, June 16, 2020, MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 58, 60
(2021).
293
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 1, 15.
294
See Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 11, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/
[https://perma.cc/H935-DKKE]; see also Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 410, 420.
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to a 2019 survey by the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society
of 7,349 German Internet users, when faced with hate speech on the
Internet, 54% of respondents were less likely to express their political opinion and 47% were less likely to participate in discussions on
the Internet.295 Given that only 8% of respondents in that study had
already been personally affected by hate speech online and 40% had
observed it, the study concluded that people are both systematically
driven out of online discussions by hate speech and allow themselves to be driven out, even if they have not (yet) been personally
attacked.296 However, from the percentage of affected respondents
(54%),297 it follows that general knowledge about the mere existence
of hate speech might discourage people from expressing their opinion online. This results in the exact opposite chilling effect.
E. Privatization of Decision-Making
A central point of criticism is the privatization of decision-making, since it is not the courts that rule on the admissibility of a post
but private companies.298 It is argued that private players are unable
to examine facts and engage in a complex balancing of factors, such
as Freedom of Expression and Right of Personality, in a short period

295

Daniel Geschke et al., Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, #Hass im Netz:
Der schleichende Angriff auf unsere Demokratie 2 (June 2019), https://www.idzjena.de/fileadmin/user_upload/_Hass_im_Netz_Executive_Summary.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6P49-YZQU].
296
Id. at 1–2.
297
Id. at 2.
298
Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 100; Stephan Koloßa, Facebook and the Rule of
Law, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV]
509, 523–24 (2020); Lee, supra note 276; Kaye, Wir schaffen das!, supra note 90;
Zipursky, supra note 9, at 1359 (“[I]t is not the German government, but the intermediaries,
that are making the decisions of what can be deleted. NetzDG does not give social media
platforms a clear picture of which content violates German law. As a result, social media
providers are the ones making the value judgments on what to delete from their deletion
centers.”).
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of time.299 That would be associated with a lack of due process.300
In this regard, the UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye also opined,
“The liability placed upon private companies to remove third party
content absent a judicial oversight is not compatible with international human rights law.”301
That said, this criticism does not consider the fact that the companies must make their own decisions, as they already do based on
their own guidelines.302 Under CDA Section 230––the antithesis to
the NetzDG––platforms also have the power to decide. For instance,
within the boundaries of good faith, they can block completely legal
and harmless statements.303 It is not the NetzDG that gives the platforms this power, but their structural characteristic as a platform.
Moreover, under German law, the final decision always remains
with the courts because users are entitled to remediation for unjustified bans.304 This compensates for a potential deficit in due process.
Thus, external regulation should not only be perceived as vesting
power in Internet providers—it also imposes restrictions on the providers by significantly limiting their power. Furthermore, with respect to NetzDG, this argument ignores the fact that platforms are
obligated to take measures anyway under existing German law and
thus completely disregards the Act’s mode of operation.305

299

Daphne Keller & Paddy Leerssen, Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical
Research on Internet Platforms and Online Speech, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY.
THE STATE OF THE FIELD AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 220, 221 (Nathaniel Persily &
Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020) (“Evidence suggests that platforms don’t do a great job as
enforcers of speech rules. Even when they apply their own, self-defined Community
Guidelines, the results often appear erratic.”).
300
Balkin, supra note 9, at 2031; see also Müller-Franken, supra note 276, at 7.
301
Kaye, supra note 18, at 4.
302
Peifer, supra note 279, at 20.
303
CDA Section 230 does not contain any restriction in that respect. Supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
304
Martin Eifert, Rechenschaftspflichten für soziale Netzwerke und Suchmaschinen. Zur
Veränderung des Umgangs von Recht und Politik mit dem Internet, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1450, 1451 (2017); see also Schiff, supra note 155, at 368.
305
Stefan Niggemeier, Der übertriebene Hass auf das Anti-Hass-Gesetz, ÜBER MEDIEN
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://uebermedien.de/24310/der-uebertriebene-hass-auf-das-anti-hassgesetz/ [https://perma.cc/N9M8-DPSD].
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As an alternative to the NetzDG, some propose to strengthen
criminal law enforcement with increased human resources.306 Although this seems generally worth supporting, the question arises as
to why this is necessary in relation to social networks. Why should
taxpayers be burdened and social networks relieved when such companies are known to be eager to avoid taxes?307 It is not the state or
the taxpayers who are at the root of the problem, but the platforms.
Therefore, they must also bear the cost of solving it.
As another alternative, it is proposed that the law be amended so
that removal and blocking under the NetzDG can only be carried out
with the consent of a judge.308 Some countries already take this approach.309 That said, it should be reiterated that, firstly, both the user
and the reporting person can bring an action under German law, and,
secondly, judicial consent was not required under the law which was
already in existence before the NetzDG.310 This was neither provided for in the procedure envisaged by the Federal Court of Justice
nor by the Telemediengesetz on the liability of a host provider.311
Moreover, this proposal would also cost taxpayers a lot of money.
Similarly, the third proposed alternative is to issue preliminary
injunctions rapidly as under unfair competition law.312 However,
this would pose an additional problem: who should have standing to
306

Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 101; see also Johanna Spiegel & Britta Heymann,
Ein Minenfeld für Anbieter sozialer Netzweke – Zwischen NetzDG, Verfassungsrecht und
Vertragsfreiheit, KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT [K&R] 344, 349 (2020) (proposing that
platforms may refuse to take action against content which is not manifestly illegal because
users could seek help from criminal authorities).
307
See, e.g., Chloe Taylor, Silicon Valley Giants Accused of Avoiding $100 Billion in
Taxes over the Last Decade, CNBC (Dec. 2, 2019, 9:44 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/12/02/silicon-valley-giants-accused-of-avoiding-100-billion-in-taxes.html
[https://perma.cc/VM5Y-EMPA].
308
Nima Mafi-Gudarzi, Desinformation: Herausforderung für die wehrhafte
Demokratie, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 65, 68 (2019).
309
Keller & Leerssen, supra note 299, at 224; Lei No. 12.965, de 23 Abril de 2014,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 4.24.2014, art. 19 (Braz.) (“[T]he provider of
Internet applications can only be subject to civil liability for damages resulting from
content generated by third parties if, after a specific court order, it does not take any steps
to…make unavailable the content that was identified as being unlawful, unless otherwise
provided by law.”).
310
Schmitz-Berndt & Berndt, supra note 111, at 27, 38.
311
Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Teleservices Act], § 10.
312
Spindler, supra note 127, at 371; Guggenberger, supra note 126, at 101.
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file an application for an injunction if no individual’s legal interests
are affected, for instance, in a case of the use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations? If numerous complaints were filed regarding the same post at the same time, different courts might decide
differently on a single post. The problem may also arise with unfair
competition because any competitor can apply for an injunction.313
However, there are often many more platform users than competitors. If a politician posts something, an exceptionally large number
of users might find it offensive. If the decisions were to be made as
quickly as according to the NetzDG, courts would be under considerable time pressure in light of the large number of controversial
posts. For blocking purposes, it would be sufficient if only one court
were to consider the content illegal. This would not prevent overblocking.
F. Expenditures
Obliging social media providers to take action inevitably comes
along with incurring costs. In view of the occasionally stringent regulatory requirements imposed by NetzDG, some feared that the
costs for social networks could become too high.314 However, after
implementation, this has not been found.315
In the explanatory part of the initial NetzDG draft, the German
government estimated that each social network would face additional annual expenditures of €28 million.316 But in reality it is difficult to capture how high this expenditure truly is. Google employed sixty-five people to deal with NetzDG complaints in the second half of 2019 and twice hired an external law firm during that

313

GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB [UWG] [ACT AGAINST UNFAIR
COMPETITION], § 8, para. 3, no. 1, translation available at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_uwg/englisch_uwg.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB5U-C5JC].
314
E.g., Opinion on the Draft of the Network Enforcement Act, supra note 131, at 11.
315
See Löber & Roßnagel, supra note 133, at 74.
316
Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft]
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 2.
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period.317 Facebook employed 125 people in that period and consulted external lawyers in fourteen cases.318 More than seventy
people worked for Twitter, some of whom are employed by external
service providers; external bodies were consulted on nineteen
complaints.319
None of this seems unreasonable or undue. After all, it is the
platforms that benefit from posted content. For example, “Facebook
exercises government-like powers, even though it is not a government: it is a private, for-profit company largely controlled by a single individual, whose primary objective is not necessarily to serve
the public interest of his political community.”320 Moreover, the Internet has left its infancy. While potential liability can burden and
inhibit an Internet provider in its initial phase, this danger is now
much less compelling.321 The networks have become so large that
they can handle the extra effort. In addition, experience in dealing
with content moderation has already been gathered from which lessons can be learned. If start-ups need to be protected, they may be
exempted from regulation, as outlined in the NetzDG.
G. NetzDG’s Miscellaneous Controversies
Further discussions about the NetzDG, which are not particularly relevant for the regulatory approach as such, are not addressed
by this Article. However, this criticism shall not be concealed. The

317

See Removals Under the Network Enforcement Law, supra note 160.
See NetzDG Transparency Report, FACEBOOK (Jan. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/facebook_netzdg_January_2020_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CK7-X8Y8].
319
See Twitter Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzbericht: Juli - Dezember 2019 [Twitter
Network Enforcement Law Report], TWITTER (Dec. 2019), https://cdn.cmstwdigitalassets.com/content/dam/transparency-twitter/data/download-netzdgreport/netzdg-jul-dec-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXU2-6SGA].
320
Francis Fukuyama & Andrew Grotto, Comparative Media Regulation in the US and
Europe, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD AND PROSPECTS FOR
REFORM 210 (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020).
321
Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 410–11; see also Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Internet is no
longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle
by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar
businesses.”).
318
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NetzDG controversy also revolved around legislative powers322 and
the Act’s compatibility with European law.323 Moreover, there are
often complaints about problems in the interpretation of the
NetzDG, such as the definition of the term “social network.”324

322

Germany has a federal system with legislative powers accorded to both the federal
state and the states. The sixteen states have the right to legislate insofar as the constitution
does not confer legislative power on the federal state. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW],
Art. 70, para. 1. As for the NetzDG, the federal government invokes its competence both
for public welfare and for law relating to economic matters. Id. at art. 74, para. 1, nos. 7,
11; see Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing Caucuses’
Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 13. Most scholars disagree
and consider the states competent. See e.g., Spindler, supra note 127, at 366; Liesching,
supra note 126, at 26; Kalscheuer & Hornung, supra note 126, at 1724–25; Ladeur &
Gostomzyk, supra note 276, at 390–91. Contra Schiff, supra note 155, at 366–67.
Nonetheless, in its two proposals to amend the NetzDG from February and April 2020, the
government maintains its assertion. See Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und
SPD [Governing Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/17741,
19; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung [Cabinet Draft], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG:
DRUCKSACHEN[BT]19/18792, 19.
323
In that regard, two questions arise. Firstly, a violation of Art. 3(2) of the E-Commerce
Directive is seen in the fact that the NetzDG applies to networks based in other EU member
states and lays down stricter rules than the respective country of domicile. E-Commerce
Directive, supra note 117, at art. 3(2) (“Member States may not, for reasons falling within
the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide information society services from
another Member State.”); see also Spindler, supra note 127, at 367; Guggenberger, supra
note 167, at 2581; Liesching, supra note 126, at 29. With respect to YouTube, Facebook,
and Twitter, the European country of domicile is Ireland. The German government invokes
an exception provided by the directive, claiming the NetzDG is necessary for public policy
reasons, “in particular the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal
offenses, including the protection of minors and the fight against any incitement to hatred
on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of human dignity concerning
individual persons.” Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Governing
Caucuses’ Draft] DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN[BT]18/12356, 14; ECommerce Directive, supra note 117, at art. 3(4)(a), no. i.; see also Patrick Nölscher, Das
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz und seine Vereinbarkeit mit dem Unionsrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 301, 307–11 (2020). Secondly, a potential
conflict arises with article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, according to which a host
provider must act “expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.” ECommerce Directive, supra note 117, at art. 14(1)(b). Some assume that NetzDG’s rigid
time limit for manifestly unlawful content is repugnant to that provision. Guggenberger,
supra note 167, at 2579. Contra Nölscher, supra, at 303–06.
324
E.g., Spindler, supra note 127, at 367–68.
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Some even consider NetzDG unconstitutional because of its indeterminacy and vagueness.325
VI. A NETZDG FOR THE UNITED STATES?

Currently, the United States takes the exact opposite approach
of the NetzDG. This continues to be widely supported326 and aligns
with the US legal tradition to reduce regulation and place great emphasis on free speech. The United States may take a different approach in terms of copyright infringement, where the law implies
obligations for service providers upon obtaining knowledge, awareness, or notification to act expeditiously to remove or disable access
to infringing material.327 However, social media content moderation
concerns the constitutional right of free speech, which is even more
significant in the United States than in Germany. As opposed to arguably most Western Democracies, the United States is traditionally
reluctant to implement laws against hate speech and, for instance,
do not outlaw Holocaust denial, notwithstanding the fact that the
cruel mass murder of Jews by the Nazi regime is not in dispute.328
Many of the statements considered unlawful in Germany might be
permissible in the United States under the First Amendment.329 Accordingly, in 2010, Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of
our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (“SPEECH”)
Act, declaring foreign judgments based on defamation lawsuits unenforceable in US courts, unless either the foreign legislation offers
at least as much free speech protection as the United States or the
defendant would have been found liable under US law as well.330
325

Marc Liesching, Was sind “rechtswidrige Inhalte” im Sinne des
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzes?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM]
809, 813–14 (2017); Liesching, supra note 126, at 26–27. Contra Schiff, supra note 155,
at 371. Some doubt the Act’s constitutionality in that regard. Ladeur & Gostomzyk, supra
note 276, at 391–92.
326
See sources cited supra notes 45, 69.
327
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)–(C).
328
Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment: The Quest for Truth in
a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 72 (1997) (arguing that Holocaust denial should
not be protected under the First Amendment).
329
Lee, supra note 276; see also Balkin, supra note 9, at 2032 (“Americans generally
have a much more libertarian free speech policy than the rest of the world.”).
330
H.R. 2765, 111th Cong. (2010)
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Nonetheless, there is a vigorous debate both in legal academia
and in politics.331 Politicians from both sides attack, for different
reasons, the blanket immunity.332 Some voices demand complete
freedom on social networks, whereas others want exactly the opposite—more regulation. Should the latter prevail, could the current
debate result in a “US NetzDG”? In order to pursue this question,
the constitutional framework will be examined, mainly shaped by
the freedom of speech. Subsequently, this Article makes policy considerations based on experiences with the German NetzDG.
A. “New Governors” under the First Amendment
Guaranteeing free expression, enshrined in the First Amendment,333 is one of the most famous, prominent, and important
achievements of the US Constitution. “[T]he right to exercise the
liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment ‘lies at the foundation
of free government by free men.’”334 The German Federal Constitutional Court found a similar characterization for the Freedom of Expression.335 Nonetheless, the value attached to this right in the
United States exceeds the already remarkable significance in other
countries, with many statements that are considered unlawful elsewhere being permissible here.336 The right to free speech applies to
all different kinds of media communication,337 including the “world
of ideas,”338 i.e., social media. Thus, posts and comments on social
network platforms are “entitled to the same First Amendment protections as other forms of media.”339

331

See discussion supra Section I.B.
Id.
333
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of
speech….).”
334
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939)).
335
See supra Section II.C.2.
336
See supra notes 328–329 and accompanying text.
337
See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (holding that video
games are protected speech under the First Amendment).
338
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (referring to social media
as “world of ideas”).
339
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d
Cir. 2019) (quoting Packingham, 582 U.S. at 1735–36).
332
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What makes social media a little more interesting is whether the
First Amendment is also binding the platforms acting as “de facto
governments.” Thus, social media users could assert their free
speech liberty against the platforms. Thus, those “New Governors,”340 being bound by that fundamental right, could not invoke it
themselves.341
As a matter of principle, only state institutions are committed by
constitutional fundamental rights. However, it can be argued that
Facebook is tantamount to a government due to its outstanding role
over modern communication. Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg
said, “In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a
traditional company. We have this large community of people, and
more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.”342 This own insight could support the notion that Facebook
resembles a government.
Yet, the Supreme Court is extremely cautious in imposing constitutional obligations on private parties. Through the state action
doctrine, the US Constitution applies only to government, and not
private, actors.343 The Court examines private conduct as to whether
“the private entity has exercised powers that are ‘traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State.’”344 In a landmark decision from
1946, Marsh v. Alabama, the Court applied the First Amendment to
distribution of religious materials on the premises of a privately
owned company town.345 Interestingly enough, it held that
“[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by

340

Klonick, supra note 21.
See id. at 1613.
342
Franklin Foer, Facebook’s War on Free Will, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/19/facebooks-war-on-free-will
[https://perma.cc/64RL-ME2Y].
343
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 360, 411 (2019) (“[T]he Free
Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech. The Free Speech Clause
does not prohibit private abridgment of speech….”).
344
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
345
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
341
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the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”346 And
social networks are indeed opening up widely to the public, which
suggests that they must respect their users’ rights.
Initially, the Court distinguished traditional media from the Internet, holding that “special justifications for regulation of the
broadcast media…are not present in cyberspace” because “the Internet can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity”
so as to the Court’s “cases provide no basis for qualifying the level
of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”347 Albeit this early holding in 1997, the current Supreme
Court stresses social media’s impact on free speech matters. Recently, in Packingham v. North Carolina from 2017, it ruled that
social media was a “protected space” for lawful speech under the
First Amendment, voiding a North Carolina statute that prohibited
sex offenders from accessing social media platforms which permit
minors to become members.348 That state law strove to prevent sex
offenders from contacting children online.349 Yet, the mere access
to social media is protected under the First Amendment:
Social media allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one another about it
on any subject that might come to mind…. By prohibiting sex offenders from using those websites,
North Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to
what for many are the principal sources for knowing
current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and
otherwise exploring the vast realms of human
thought and knowledge. These websites can provide
perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to
a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. They

346
347
348
349

Id. at 506.
Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 870 (1997).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
Id.
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allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox.’350
From those remarks, some might infer a First Amendment commitment, given social media’s special role with respect to statements
of opinion.351 However, the defendant in that case was the government, not a platform.
Furthermore, in an even more recent decision, the Supreme
Court once again narrowed exceptions to its state action doctrine.
In Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, a ruling along
ideological lines, the Court’s conservative majority held that public
access television, operated through a private nonprofit corporation
which had been designated by New York City, is not subject to First
Amendment commitment.352 The Court summarized that, according
to its case law, a private entity can only be considered a state actor
in a few instances, such as when it has an exclusive public function
or when the government exerts strong influence.353 However,
“merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state
actors subject to First Amendment constraints.”354 What makes the
judgment even more important for social media is that the Court explicitly allows a private party for an “appropriate editorial discretion
within [its] open forum.”355 Thus, the Halleck precedent speaks not
only firmly against social platforms’ obligations under the First
350

Id. at 1733.
See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 21, at 1611–13 (“Future litigation might use
Packingham’s acknowledgment of a First Amendment right to social media access as a
new basis to argue that these platforms perform quasi-municipal functions….The Court’s
new definition in Packingham of online speech platforms as forums…might threaten the
viability of arguments that these companies have their own First Amendment rights as
speakers.”). However, Klonick concludes that courts are unlikely to treat social media
platforms as state actors. Id. at 1658–59.
352
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1933 (2019).
353
Id. at 1928 (“Under this Court’s cases, a private entity can qualify as a state actor in a
few limited circumstances—including, for example, (i) when the private entity performs a
traditional, exclusive public function…(ii) when the government compels the private entity
to take a particular action…or (iii) when the government acts jointly with the private
entity.”).
354
Id. at 1930–31.
355
Id.
351
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Amendment but also in favor of an authority to decide which content
they ban and which they don’t—based on their dominion.
Moreover, the Halleck Court ruled that “the fact that the government licenses, contracts with, or grants a monopoly to a private entity does not convert the private entity into a state actor—unless the
private entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public function.”356 Hence, even if the federal government considered Facebook, for instance, a monopoly under law for sharing user generated
content online, that mere fact would not expose the site to a First
Amendment commitment.
After all, even if some find it appropriate and desirable from a
policy perspective to bring social media providers under free speech
scrutiny, there is simply very little indication that the Supreme
Court—notwithstanding its contemplation of social media’s importance but in the face of its reluctance to expand the state action
doctrine—would be willing to take that approach.357 Therefore, it
must be acknowledged that Packingham was a unanimous judgment
whereas Halleck was a 5-4 decision. Yet, the three concurring Justices in Packingham358 then went on to vote in line with the other
two conservative Justices in Halleck, who had not participated in
Packingham,359 building a front against expanding the state action
doctrine. This fact stresses Halleck’s relevance.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that recent case law does
have an impact on governmental content moderation. In Knight First
Amendment Institute v. Trump, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals

356

Id. at 1931.
See Eric Goldman, Private Publishers Aren’t State Actors–Manhattan Community
Access v. Halleck, TECH. & MKTG L. BLOG (June 26, 2019),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/06/private-publishers-arent-state-actorsmanhattan-community-access-v-halleck.htm [https://perma.cc/5VSH-QRG7]; see also
Evelyn Douek, COVID-19 and Social Media Content Moderation, LAWFARE (Mar. 25,
2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/covid-19-and-social-media-content-moderation
[https://perma.cc/Y4PC-YRRW] (“Of course, platforms are not the government and are
not bound by the First Amendment.”); Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 15, 17
(“Attempting to extend First Amendment obligations to private actors is not only
constitutionally incoherent, but endangers the First Amendment rights of private actors
against compelled speech.”).
358
Being Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas.
359
Being Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.
357
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held that, pursuant to the First Amendment, the President, acting in
their official role and not as a private party, shall not delete comments on their tweets or ban other users from accessing their account.360 However, this judgment only concerned the government
acting on Twitter, not Twitter itself acting.
B. Social Media’s Free Speech
Concluding that social media providers’ content moderation is
not subject to First Amendment scrutiny inevitably results in recognizing platforms’ entitlement to free speech. Yet, scope and extent
of that right are in dispute.
In that context, one could think of Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a
Supreme Court decision from 1974, to undergird and enhance social
media’s shield against any governmental interference.361 Here, the
Court unanimously struck down the “right of reply” under a Florida
statute, which conferred power on political candidates to answer
criticism and attacks by a newspaper in that newspaper and, thus,
violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press.362 An important rationale, on which the Supreme Court grounded its finding,
resembles an argument against excessive banning of content: a right
of reply could have chilling effects on newspapers since, in the face
of potential claims for responses, they might refrain from criticism
of politicians, which then “dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate.”363 Similarly, some suppose that content moderation prompts users to fear removal and, thus, to shy away from making any statements on social media.364 Yet, this Article has already
refuted that assumption.365
Furthermore, negative content moderation can hardly be compared to a right of reply in newspapers. While a newspaper indeed
360

Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236 (2d
Cir. 2019) (“In sum, since he took office, the President has consistently used the Account
as an important tool of governance and executive outreach. For these reasons, we conclude
that the factors pointing to the public, non-private nature of the Account and its interactive
features are overwhelming.”).
361
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
362
Id. at 258.
363
Id. at 257.
364
Supra Section V.D.
365
Id.

2021]

THE GERMAN NETZDG

1145

may have a strong incentive to avoid replies by politicians as those
replies take up space on the papers which blocks other articles or
advertisements,366 there is no equivalent incentive in social media.
More importantly, while a “newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising,”367 a platform
is, by and large, exactly this.368 The resulting newspaper’s right of
“choice of material to go into a newspaper,”369 hence, cannot apply
to social media providers because platforms do not exercise a positive decision on what content they show but instead mainly render
negative decisions on what content not to show.
In sum, the broad right accorded by the Tornillo Court to newspapers is not applicable to social media providers, since the latter do
not face space limitations and publish user-submitted, rather than its
own, content.370 In terms of free speech, we must distinguish between one’s own statements and other people’s statements that one
allows to be broadcast.
However, some maintain that “the First Amendment protects the
right of those platforms to carry whatever content they see fit”371 or
that “under First Amendment jurisprudence, any state-mandated
censorship that occurs outside the context of a judicial determination
of the content’s illegality…is an unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech.”372 Yet, grounding the latter assertion on Bantam Books v.
Sullivan373 seems questionable. That decision, handed down by the

366

See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
See id. at 258.
368
See Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1012 (“Just as a telephone company is not engaging in
speech of its own when its users speak, ISPs regularly facilitate others’ speech rather than
speaking for themselves. As conduits, ISPs’ concerns are different than those of initial
speakers.”); see also Klonick, supra note 21, at 1660 (“[P]latforms do not actively solicit
specific types of content, unlike how an editorial desk might solicit reporting or journalistic
coverage. Instead, users use the site to post or share content independently.”).
369
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (“A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or
conduit for news, comment, and advertising.”).
370
See Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in
Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 502–03 (2016)
(distinguishing Google’s business from newspapers privileged by Tornillo).
371
Fukuyama & Grotto, supra note 320, at 209.
372
Nunziato, supra note 9, at 1537.
373
See generally Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); see Nunziato,
supra note 9, at 1537–38 n.96.
367
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Supreme Court in 1963, concerned allegedly “obscene, indecent or
impure language” publications.374 Here, the state of Rhode Island
had created a commission to “educate the public[,]…investigate and
recommend the prosecution of all violations” in terms of those publications. The Court almost unanimously held that the ultimate purpose “of the Commission’s notices was to intimidate distributors
and retailers and that they had resulted in the suppression of the sale
of the books listed.”375 Besides the fact that the decision was primarily grounded in Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns,376
distribution of books and other paper publications can hardly be
compared to modern social media forums. Admittedly, the Court
stated that “[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech
calls for…sensitive tools.”377 Nonetheless, it iterated that the Constitution does not protect obscenity.378
Once again, the Court thus clarified that First Amendment protection is not absolute. If a statement or publication does not fall
within the scope of the First Amendment, the publisher or distributer
cannot invoke that fundamental right either. It follows that the First
Amendment does in no way grant an unrestricted permission to publish or distribute whatever you want. Rather, Bantam Books, even
though it was decided almost sixty years ago and dealt with paper
publications, reminds us that regulating freedom of expression
raises due process challenges, especially when determining the
“finely drawn line”379 between free and illegitimate speech.
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Halleck does not
stand in the way of a mandatory content moderation. Indeed, the
Court conferred “appropriate editorial discretion within [an] open
forum,”380 however, upon “all private property owners and private
lessees who open their property for speech.”381 Thus, the Court did
not base its decision on the First Amendment. It rather left open the

374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381

Id. at 59, 72.
Id. at 58, n.1.
See id. at 66, 71.
Id. at 66 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958)).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1931 (2019).
Id. at 1930–31.
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question of whether the First Amendment prevents the government
from obliging private parties to open their property for speech by
others and referred to Turner v. FCC from 1994.382 In that case, the
Court found it constitutional to require cable systems to allocate a
percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations since
those must-carry provisions were content neutral.383
Albeit the US policy approach in CDA Section 230 to guard Internet platforms against any liability for users’ disparaging
speech,384 the First Amendment, according to the majority of US
courts and scholars, does not require wholesale protection from all
platform liability.385 Rather, the Act “reflects a ‘policy choice,’ not
a First Amendment imperative.”386 The opposing view that the First
Amendment requires an entire protection in order to avoid collateral
censorship since “[w]ithout [that] constitutional rule, Internet intermediaries would limit a significant amount of constitutionally protected speech”387 by opting for “the least costly method” of removing in case of doubt388 remains an unfounded assumption, neither

382

Id. at n.2.
See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
384
CDA § 230.
385
See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016);
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (“There is no reason inherent in the
technological features of cyberspace why First Amendment and defamation law should
apply differently in cyberspace than in the brick and mortar world. Congress, however, has
chosen for policy reasons to immunize from liability for defamatory or obscene
speech….”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Balkin, supra note 44, at 434 (“[Section 230] is not required by First Amendment
doctrine.”); Nina I. Brown and Jonathan Peters, Say This, Not That: Government
Regulation And Control Of Social Media, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 521, 539 (“This immunity
[granted by Section 230] is not a constitutional grant. It comes from Congress, and
Congress can take it away.”); Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 419; William H. Freivogel,
Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 17, 48
(2011); Tushnet, supra note 47, at 988. For several examples for CDA Section 230
extending beyond First Amendment protection, see Goldman, supra note 69, at 36–39.
386
Gucci Am., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
387
Note, supra note 45, at 2035.
388
Id. at 2038, 2043 n.140 (“[I]ncreased liability will increase the proportion of protected
speech that is removed in an effort to reduce defamation.”).
383
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supported by empirical data nor case law from Germany where content moderation is mandatory.389 What is more, a claim for remediation helps decrease the incentive to excessively delete content.
C. Leeway for Regulation
Although the broad protection granted by the Tornillo Court is
not applicable to social media providers, the providers are generally
entitled to free speech and not bound by the First Amendment.
Hence, with respect to potential regulation of content on social media, both social networks and their users may assert First Amendment protection against government interference. On the other hand,
it does not compel an absolute and complete First Amendment protection. Firstly, it is not proven that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that fundamental right enjoins any regulation of social media
content. Rather, according to the prevailing view in the United
States, the First Amendment does not require protection from all
platform liability.390 Secondly, there are several categories of unprotected speech—e.g., obscenity391 or fighting words.392 If those actions do not fall within the scope of users’ freedom of expression,
consequentially, platforms cannot invoke any First Amendment protection either. Otherwise, the First Amendment would safeguard
statements which it exempts form its realm at the same time.
On the contrary, private property owners’ “appropriate editorial
discretion within [their] open forum”393 lays a solid foundation for
social media’s entitlement to impose rules and enforce them through
content moderation. Moreover, governmental regulation of content
moderation on social media platforms must both respect due process

389

Firstly, excessive over-blocking can be discerned neither from the transparency
reports’ data nor from case law on conducted bans. See discussion supra Section III.B.2,
Sections IV.A.–B., Section V.C. Rather, judicial control and economic incentives strongly
militate against such a phenomenon. See supra Section V.C. Secondly, the transparency
reports’ data also show that the bulk of bans are due to the standards that the networks
imposed themselves and not on German law. See supra Section III.B.2.
390
Supra discussion Section VI.B.
391
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (“[O]bscene material is not protected by
the First Amendment.”).
392
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (exempting “You are a Goddamned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist” from First Amendment protection).
393
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1931 (2019).
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requirements under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, respectively, and guarantee that legitimate speech is not overly affected by
measures against illegitimate speech, as can be inferred from case
law. “[T]he Government ‘may not suppress lawful speech as the
means to suppress unlawful speech.’”394 At the same time, it is
worth noting that the Supreme Court in Tornillo stated that media,
even though entitled to First Amendment protection, to a certain
extent must contribute to an environment of free speech (and, therefore, refrain from collaboration to constrain that freedom).395
As one can see, any potential regulation of social networks’ content moderation lies within this constitutional area. Generally speaking, there is much to suggest that moderate regulation of social media by compelling its providers to remove unlawful content can be
reconciled with the First Amendment.
D. Lessons from NetzDG and Potential Developments
What could such a regulation look like? The United States can
go two different ways, leading away from CDA Section 230. On the
one hand, as called for by mostly conservative voices, the possibilities for intervention by social networks can be limited. However,
President Trump’s demands were crooked: he claimed free speech
for himself, although he was obliged to grant it on social networks—
and had himself violated this fundamental right.396 More importantly, platforms are entitled to free speech. So, if Twitter wants
to comment on his post, it is protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, it would be dangerous not to fill the legal vacuum with
voluntary content moderation. Many examples of Internet abuse

394

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002)).
395
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974) (“That Amendment
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a
condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede
the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they
impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means
freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not.” (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
396
Supra note 360.
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make content moderation indispensable, such as an editorial
launched by the Los Angeles Times, allowing Internet users to edit
it without limitations and resulting in people posting disparaging
content and trolls publishing pornography.397 Without moderation,
Internet platforms cannot remain a pleasant and enjoyable place.
What is more, there would likely be chilling effects on expressing
opinion on social media sites.398
On the other hand, heightened regulation of social networks is
conceivable in order to limit their leeway under CDA Section 230
and make content moderation mandatory. The NetzDG can provide
some guiding principles and mechanisms in this respect: (1) statutory regulation based on the NetzDG model guarantees a certain
equality of treatment among the platform users and (2) a remedy in
cases of platforms’ failure to enforce their self-imposed standards.
A minimum number of users can be made a prerequisite for application in order to protect start-ups. Like the NetzDG, a regulation
should oblige providers only with respect to already prohibited content. It might be retorted that this would raise the issue of dealing
with fifty different jurisdictions in the United States.399 Therefore, a
pragmatic approach could draw on categories of unprotected speech
under the First Amendment.400 Under the status quo, statements
which are supposed to be excluded from the First Amendment are
actually de facto protected––on the Internet of all places, where content can be distributed widely and easily. At the very least, the most
terrible content—such as revenge porn—should be excluded from
the comprehensive protection.401 The exception of sex trafficking
397

Grimmelmann, supra note 37, at 44–45.
Supra Section V.D.
399
Note, supra note 45, at 2036. To the contrary, in Germany, despite its federal system,
all 16 states share the same civil and criminal law because it is enacted on the federal level.
400
See Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 21 (restricting immunity under CDA Section
230(c)(1) to “speech” instead of “information”); supra Section VI.C.
401
Unfortunately, revenge porn and nonconsensual pornography are covered by CDA
Section 230’s blanket immunity. See Godaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 760
(Tex. 2013); see also Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 413 (listing revenge porn operators
among providers who are immunized). An opposing view proposes to exclude websites
from immunity that “purposely solicit the posting of revenge porn” as cocreators and
invokes Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC; see Danielle
Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
345, 359 n.86 (2014).
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may serve as an example here.402 Additionally, these heinous acts
have absolutely nothing to do with the First Amendment. In particular, sites that are designed to infringe rights should not be privileged.403 Shielding those business models was not intended by the
CDA.404 Interestingly enough, the DOJ’s September 2020 draft proposed a transfer of the good faith requirement in CDA Section 230,
subparagraph (c)(2)(A) to subparagraph (c)(1) and suggested clarification of denying protection for purposefully harmful action providers.405
That said, carving out several subject matters from CDA Section
230’s immunity shall not result in the tort law dilemma that the act
was intended to end.406 Therefore, a potential regulation should ensure that providers will only face damages, fines, or government intervention in case of systematic violation. A mere claim for take
down would already contribute significantly to help victims stop infringements.407
At the same time, any potential regulation on social media liability in the United States should draw its lessons from NetzDG’s
flaws and shortcomings. For example, a complaint procedure should
be open to every affected person, whether or not they are inside the
402

CDA § 230(e)(5). The DOJ’s September 2020 draft proposed to further exempt
terrorism, child sex abuse, and cyber-stalking from CDA Section 230’s immunity. SECTION
BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 2.
403
Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 417–18; see also Citron & Franks, supra note 79,
at 22.
404
Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 409, 416 (“Extending immunity to Bad Samaritans
undermines § 230’s mission by eliminating incentives for better behavior by those in the
best position to minimize harm.”).
405
SECTION BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 2. The preceding Executive Order on
Preventing Online Censorship had already requested this. Exec. Order No. 13925, 3 C.F.R.
§ 34079 (2020).
406
Citron & Franks, supra note 79, at 20–21; see discussion supra Section I.A. The
DOJ’s draft of September 2020 intended to keep the overruling of that dilemma in its
proposed paragraph (c)(1)(C). SECTION BY SECTION, supra note 26, at 1.
407
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (“One possible solution
to this statutorily created problem is the approach taken by Congress in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.”); cf. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1013 (“[A] regime that limited
available remedies against ISPs to injunctive relief—whether conditioned on compliance
with notice-and-takedown, as with the DMCA, or as a blanket rule for ISPs that lacked
actual knowledge of illegality—would substantially decrease the chilling effect on ISPs of
altering § 230.”); Citron & Wittes, supra note 47, at 419.
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social network. Furthermore, Congress should pay particular attention to the potential law’s scope if it decides to limit the application
to only large providers, e.g., through a minimum number of users.
In order to squash concerns about over-blocking, the Act should provide for a claim for remediation in case of unjustified bans.408 However, above all, the discussion should focus––more than in Germany––on internal regulation because this approach is much more
pivotal in practice.409 If the government does not want to dictate
which statement is permissible and which is not, it can leave the
details to the social networks, simply ensuring that standards are set
and implemented. It should be noted that the NetzDG guarantees
pressure on these providers410 and has an important complementary
function.
CONCLUSION

The German NetzDG takes a different approach to regulating
hate speech than is currently seen in the United States. The effects
of the Act are limited––both positive and negative. Court decisions
as well as the published transparency reports show that, in practice,
the provider-imposed standards play a greater role in removing posts
on social networks than the NetzDG. Many fears were exaggerated
or based on misunderstandings. The NetzDG seems to be a necessary complement to the self-imposed standards of social networks.
At the same time, it ensures a certain pressure on these platforms.
Hence, the benefits of the Act outweigh its drawbacks.
Therefore, the NetzDG can stimulate the debate in the United
States: a regulation would have less dramatic consequences than
many fear. Currently, CDA Section 230 appears somewhat outdated. When the law was enacted around twenty-five years ago,
408

Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1014–15.
Klonick, supra note 21, at 1666, 1670 (“Any proposed regulation…should work with
an understanding of the intricate self-regulatory structure already in place in order to be the
most effective for users and preserve the democratizing power of online platforms.”).
410
See Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L. REV. 2418, 2437 (2020)
(“[A]s public pressure increased over the last ten years and as European nations, like
Germany, forced Facebook to comply with their national speech laws, Facebook’s
Community Standards became more restrictive and more similar to European standards.”).
409
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many abuses and developments could not yet be foreseen. A reform
initiative would face considerable resistance but would modernize
US Internet law. Certain mechanisms of the NetzDG have already
been proposed by legal scholars. Experience with the NetzDG
supports these proposals. Requiring an upfront judicial consent to
every blocking of content on a platform seems neither feasible nor
suitable to keep the number of removals low. Rather, a combination
of severe consequences for systematic violations and individual
takedown claims in cases of legal infringements, securing a content
removal in the event of failure of provider-imposed standards, seems
desirable. Such a legal claim would possibly have helped Samantha
Jespersen considerably.
At the same time, the United States can learn from shortcomings
of the NetzDG. Nonetheless, the main cautionary tale is the debate
about the NetzDG––a discussion based on misconceptions, biases,
and exaggerated assumed impacts.

